Staff Report Coastal Development Permit Application E-05-001 - (Pacific Gas & Electric Company) by California Coastal Commission,
Humboldt State University 
Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University 
State Reports and Publications Humboldt State University Sea Level Rise Initiative 
8-31-2005 
Staff Report Coastal Development Permit Application E-05-001 - 
(Pacific Gas & Electric Company) 
California Coastal Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/hsuslri_state 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA-THE RESOURCES AGENCY 
.! 
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 
45 FREMONT, SUITE 2000 
,~SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105-2219 
VOICE AND TDD (415) 904- 5200 








August 1, 2005 
September 19, 2005 
TRL-SF 
August 31, 2005 
September 15, 2005 
COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT APPLICATION 




Substantive File Documents: 
E-05-001 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
Humboldt Bay Power Plant, adjacent to Humboldt Bay 
near King Salmon, Humboldt County. 
Construct and operate an Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation (ISFSI) to store used nuclear fuel from the 
Humboldt Bay Power Plant. 
See Appendix A 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The proposed development is the construction and operation by Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
(PG&E, or the Permittee) of a facility to store spent nuclear fuel and other materials from the 
Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant at a site just east of the community of King Salmon and 
adjacent to Humboldt Bay. The facility, known as an Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation (ISFSI), would consist mainly of a below-grade concrete vault containing six 
canisters filled with used nuclear material. 
The power plant consists of two gas-fired electrical generating units and a nuclear generating 
unit that was shut down in 1976. Its spent fuel has been stored since that time in a wet storage 
pool adjacent to the power plant. This fuel is highly radioactive and requires secure storage for 
thousands of years to prevent harm to humans and the environment. Because federal law pre-
empts the state from imposing requirements related to nuclear safety or radiation hl;lZards, this 
report evaluates only those issues necessary to determine conformity to the policies of the 
Coastal Act and does not impose requirements on aspects of the facility pre-empted by federal 
law. 
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Key Issues: Significant issues related to the proposed project's conformity to Coastal Act 
policies include: 
• Perpetual presence of the ISFSI: Because there are no offsite alternative locations available 
to store the spent nuclear fuel and no certainty as to when or if such locations might be 
available, the ISFSI would be expected to remain at this site for the foreseeable future. The 
findings herein are therefore based on the long-term presence of the ISFSI at this location. 
• Geologic Hazards: This report describes the seismic characteristics of the project site and 
surrounding area, the slope stability of the project site, and coastal erosion concerns at the 
site. As noted above, federal law pre-empts local or state governments from imposing 
conditions related to radiological hazards, and the findings in this report regarding these 
geologic issues therefore address only those concerns related to structural stability, stability 
of nearby landforms, and the potential for coastal erosion to affect the proposed project as 
required by the Coastal Act. 
The Commission staff geologist generally concurs with PG&E's descriptions and analyses of 
the project site's geologic characteristics, which have also been recognized as adequate for 
the proposed project by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Staff is 
recommending through Special Conditions 1 and 2 that the site's slope stability and rate of 
shoreline erosion be monitored to provide necessary assurance that site conditions remain 
suitable for the facility. However, even with these Special Conditions, staff has determined 
that the proposed development of the ISFSI at this location does not conform to Coastal Act 
policies related to geologic hazards. This inconsistency results in a conflict with other 
Coastal Act policies that must be resolved through application of Coastal Act Section 
30007.5, as described below. 
• Visual: The storage area would be on a visually prominent blufftop near the shoreline of 
Humboldt Bay. The storage structure would be below grade, but other structures and fixtures 
would be visible from nearby public areas. Special Condition #3 would require PG&E to 
use neutral tones on all visible structures and direct lighting inward and downward to the 
extent allowed by NRC requirements; however, even with this Special Condition, the project 
would not conform to the Coastal Act's visual resources policy. This inconsistency results in 
a conflict with other Coastal Act policies that must be resolved through application of 
Coastal Act Section 30007.5, as described below. 
• Marine Resources and Water Quality: The project would increase the amount of impervious 
surface on the power plant site and change the stormwater drainage patterns, but these 
aspects are not expected to adversely affect coastal resources. Soil removed for construction 
will be stockpiled near the power plant site, and Special Condition #4 would require PG&E 
to submit a Revegetation Plan for Executive Director approval. Installation ofthe ISFSI 
would allow decommissioning of the nuclear unit at the power plant, which would reduce 
existing discharges from the plant. The ISFSI would also result in improvements over 
existing conditions, as it would be less susceptible to risks from expected geologic events 
that would create adverse effects to nearby coastal waters and wetlands. 
• 
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• Public Access: The ISFSI would be located about 150 feet from the Humboldt Bay shoreline 
and near an existing trail used for shoreline access. Presence of the ISFSI would require a 
security zone that would affect public access. Additionally, because the ISFSI is expected to 
be at this site for the foreseeable future, the predicted shoreline erosion and sea level rise is 
likely to affect public access due to the eventual need to modify the existing shoreline 
protective device or construct a new one. Further, as the shoreline moves landwards towards 
the ISFSI, the existing public access may decrease or be eliminated due to the necessary 
separation between the ISFSI and the public. Special Condition 5 would require PG&E to 
maintain and enhance the existing accessway by establishing a deed restriction for the 
accessway and submitting a plan subject to Executive Director review and approval 
describing measures necessary to provide continued safe public access to the site. 
• Conflict Resolution: The project as proposed is inconsistent with Coastal Act Sections 
30253(1 )-(2) and 30251. However, denying the ISFSI or modifying it to resolve these 
inconsistencies would result in nonconformity to other Coastal Act policies, specifically 
Sections 30230, 30231, and 30240 related to marine resources, water quality, and 
environmentally sensitive habitat areas. 
The Commission must therefore apply Sections 30007.5 and 30200(b), which allow the 
Commission to approve projects involving these conflicts in a manner that, on balance, is 
most protective of significant coastal resources. Staff recommends the Commission 
determine the benefits to marine resources, water quality, and environmentally sensitive 
habitat areas outweigh the project's nonconformity to Coastal Act policies regarding 
geologic risks and visual resources. 
Staff recommends that the Commission approve the proposed project, as conditioned. 
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I move that the Commission approve Coastal Development Permit E-05-001 subject to 
conditions set forth in the staff recommendation specified below. 
Staff recommends a YES vote. Passage of this motion will result in approval of the permit as 
conditioned and adoption of the following resolution and findings. The motion passes only by 
affirmative vote of a majority of Commissioners present. 
Resolution: 
The Commission hereby approves the Coastal Development Permit for the proposed 
project and adopts the findings set forth below on grounds that the development as 
conditioned will be in conformity with the policies of Chapter 3 of the Coastal Act. 
Approval of the permit complies with the California Environmental Quality Act because 
either 1) feasible mitigation measures and/or alternatives have been incorporated to 
substantially lessen any significant adverse effects of the development on the 
environment, or 2) there are no further feasible mitigation measures or alternatives that 
would substantially lessen any significant adverse impacts of the development on the 
environment. 
2 STANDARD CONDITIONS 
1. Notice of Receipt and Acknowledgment: This permit is not valid until a copy ofthe permit 
is signed by the Permittee or authorized agent, acknowledging receipt ofthe permit and the 
acceptance of the terms and conditions, is returned to the Commission office. 
2. Expiration: Construction activities for the proposed project must be initiated within two 
years of issuance of this permit. This permit will expire two years from the date on which 
the Commission approved the proposed project if development has not begun. Construction 
of the development shall be pursued in a diligent manner and completed in a reasonable 
period oftime. Application for extension of the permit must be made at least six months 
prior to the expiration date. 
3. Interpretation: Any questions of intent or interpretation of any condition will be resolved 
by the Executive Director of the Commission (hereinafter, "Executive Director") or the 
Commission. 
4. Assignment: The permit may be assigned to any qualified person, provided the assignee 
files with the Commission an affidavit accepting all terms and conditions of the permit. 
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5. Terms and Conditions Run with the Land: These terms and conditions shall be perpetual, 
and it is the intention of the Commission and the Permittee to bind all future owners and 
possessors of the subject property to the terms and conditions. 
3 SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
1. Monitoring Bluff Slopes: The Permittee shall annually monitor the bluff slopes adjacent to 
the ISFSI structure for sliding, ground movement, or other motion. Monitoring shall be done 
using the measures and monitoring devices described in the project's Safety Analysis Report. 
No'later than June 30 of each year, the Permittee shall submit annual reports, prepared by a 
licensed Civil Engineering Geologist, to the Executive Director describing the results of the 
monitoring. The Permittee shall notify County staff and the Executive Director immediately 
in the event of slope failure or movement that may indicate imminent slope failure. If 
monitoring results for any annual report indicate slope movement may require additional 
measures to protect the development, the Permittee shall submit a coastal development 
permit application or request for an amendment to this permit. 
2. Monitoring Shoreline Erosion: The Permittee shall conduct surveys of the shoreline of the 
ISFSI site no less than annually. The surveys shall start during the first year of project 
construction and continue through the life ofthe project. Surveys shall be conducted by a 
licensed Surveyor or Civil Engineer. Each annual survey shall be performed in the early 
spring when the beach level is lqwest and the lower bluff face is most exposed, or as close to 
that time as is feasible. Each survey shall record the position ofthe upper bluff edge and 
lower toe of the bluff using conventional survey techniques (total station, rod and level, plane 
table, etc.), differential Global Positioning System (GPS), photogrammetry (with current 
ortho-rectified aerial photographs), by ground Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), or 
other comparable technique. Survey techniques used shall be consistent throughout the 
survey period or shall allow consistent comparison of yearly data. Survey measurements 
shall be accurate within 0.5' horizontal and 1.0' vertical. 
The Permittee shall report the results of each survey to the Executive Director by June 30 of 
each year. Each report shall include narrative and mapped analysis of the survey data, a 
determination of the average retreat rate for the full survey area, identification of any 
locations where the bluff change rate is more than two standard deviations from the average. 
Bluff change shall be calculated at 50' intervals (or smaller) to determine the average retreat, 
standard deviation and to identify areas of outlier retreat rates. 
If monitoring results for any annual survey indicate the development may be threatened by 
coastal erosion in less than five years, the Permittee shall submit within sixty days of the 
annual survey report a coastal development permit application or request for an amendment 
to this permit to relocate the ISFSI or other project components as needed. 
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3. Visual Resources: All structures and fixtures at the ISFSI's blufftop storage site visible from 
public areas shall be painted or otherwise finished in neutral tones that minimize their 
visibility from those public areas. Lighting at the storage area shall be directed downward 
and inward to the extent allowed by Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements. 
4. Revegetation of Soil Disposal Area: Prior to starling project construction, the Permittee 
shall provide a soil disposal area revegetation plan subject to Executive Director review and 
approval. The plan, at minimum, shall include a list of the species to be used, planting 
density, timing of the planting, performance standards (e.g., percent coverage and timing), 
and monitoring that will be done to ensure the performance standards are met. The species 
used shall be limited to non-invasive species. The Plan shall also describe other measures 
and Best Management Practices, including maximum slopes of the soil, that will be taken to 
minimize runoff and sedimentation from the soil disposal area into nearby coastal waters or 
wetlands. 
5. Public Access: 
a) Deed Restriction: Prior to issuance of the coastal development permit, the applicant 
shall submit to the Executive Director for review and approval documentation 
demonstrating that the applicant has executed and recorded against the parcel(s) governed 
by this permit a deed restriction, in a form and content acceptable to the Executive 
Director: (1) indicating that pursuant to this permit, the California Coastal Commission 
has authorized development on the subject property subject to terms and conditions that 
restrict the use and enjoyment of that property; and, (2) imposing the Special Conditions 
of this permit as covenants, conditions and restrictions on the use and enjoyment of the 
Property. The deed restriction shall include a legal description of the entire parcel or 
parcels governed by this permit. The deed restriction shall also indicate that, in the event 
of an extinguishment or termination of the deed restriction for any reason, the terms and 
conditions of this permit shall continue to restrict the use and enjoyment ofthe subject 
property so long as either this permit or the development it authorizes, or any part, 
modification, or amendment thereof, remains in existence on or with respect to the 
subject property. 
The deed restriction shall establish an accessway based on the existing public use trail 
and shall extend along the shoreline from the western end of the power plant site near 
King Salmon to the rail line on the northern end of the power plant site. The accessway 
shall be no less than twenty feet wide at any point as measured landward from the 
Ordinary High Water Mark (OHWM). The deed restriction shall also reflect that this 
accessway will move with the shoreline; that is, the minimum dimensions of the 
accessway shall be maintained as the OHWM moves due to short- or long-term events 
such as coastal erosion, sea level rise, or other phenomena. 
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b) Access Plan: Prior to starting project construction, the Permittee shall submit an access 
plan subject to Executive Director review and approval. The plan shall, at minimum, 
include the following: 
• A legal description of the accessway as recorded on the property deed. 
• A description of improvements that will be made to ensure public access is safely 
maintained. The improvements shall include, at minimum: 
• Measures that will be taken to maintain the accessway in a safe and usable 
condition to ensure safe pedestrian use (e.g., providing a level walking surface, 
regular inspections of accessway conditions, placing garbage receptacles on or 
near the trail, etc.). 
• Signs at both ends of the accessway that describe the access available and the 
conditions related to the adjacent ISFSI that may affect access. The design and 
placement of signs should be consistent with those developed as part ofthe 
Humboldt Bay Trails Feasibility Study. 
• A schedule to complete installation of the initial improvements described in the 
plan. These improvements shall be installed concurrent with construction of the 
ISFSI and shall be completed within 30 days of the storage casks being moved 
into the ISFSI storage area. 
c) Changes to Access: If any change to the safety or security measures associated with the 
ISFSI results in a change to, or limitation on, public access to the shoreline, PG&E shall 
file a complete application to amend this permit. The application for an amendment shall 
describe the nature of the change and its effect on public access, and shall include 
proposed measures that would provide at least an equivalent amount of shoreline access 
on or near the project site. 
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4 FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS 
The Commission finds and declares as follows: 
4.1 PROJECT PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of the project is to move spent nuclear fuel from its current location in a 
wet storage facility at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) to a dry storage system, known as 
an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSn. The ISFSI would also store a limited 
amount of "Greater Than Class C" radioactive materials. 1 Only fuel and material generated at 
the HBPP is proposed to be stored at the ISFSI. Moving the spent fuel out of wet storage would 
facilitate dismantling the nuclear unit at the HBPP and would allow its eventual 
decommissioning. PG&E proposes to store the material at the ISFSI until it can be moved to an 
off-site permanent repository to be established by the federal government; however, because 
there is no certainty as to when such a facility might be available, it is presumed that the ISFSI 
would remain at this location for the foreseeable future. 
Although described as "spent" fuel, it is considered high-level radioactive waste and must be 
stored securely for tens of thousands of years. As the fuel is used in a nuclear reactor, its level of 
radioactivity increases significantly due to radioisotopes formed during the nuclear fission 
process. When the fuel is removed from the reactor, it is initially stored in a "wet storage" pool 
adjacent to the power plant. The water in the pool and the materials used in the pool's 
construction provide the shielding necessary to prevent human and environmental exposure to 
the high level of radioactivity present when the fuel is first removed from the reactor. The fuel 
must remain in the pool for at least five years until that initial level of radioactivity is reduced. It 
can then be transferred to another facility, if one if available. All material currently stored in the 
pool at the HBPP has been there for several decades, so much of its initial radiological "heat" has 
dissipated; however, it still requires secure storage for the foreseeable future. 
4.2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
Background 
The HBPP is located just south of Eureka along the shoreline of Humboldt Bay near the 
community of King Salmon (see Exhibit 1- Location Map). The power plant currently consists 
of two natural gas-powered electrical generating units and an inactive nuclear generating unit. 
The nuclear unit was built in the early 1960s and started commercial operation in August 1963. 
It was shut down in July 1976, pending review by PG&E of seismic safety upgrades that would 
be needed to conform an order issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in May of 
that year. In 1983, PG&E determined it would not be cost-effective to" perform the modifications 
1 
"Greater Than Class C" waste is low-level radioactive waste generated by the conunercial sector that exceeds U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Conunission (NRC) concentration limits for Class C low-level waste, as specified in 10 CFR 
Part 61, and requires special storage. 
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necessary to re-start the unit and started the process to put the plant in "safe storage" (or 
SAFSTOR) pursuant to NRC regulations at 10 CPR 50. In 1988, ~he NRC approved PG&E's 
SAFSTOR plan and issued a "possess-but-not-operate" license to PG&E that expires in 2015. 
Since then, PG&E has taken a number of actions related to decommissioning or to improve 
safety or environmental conditions at the facility, including removing asbestos, characterizing 
radiological conditions of various structures, and replacing a 250-foot ventilation stack with a 
smaller 50-foot stack to reduce seismic risk. In 1999, PG&E proposed to the NRC that an ISPSI 
be constructed to store the spent fuel from the HBPP. fu 2003, PG&E submitted its application 
for a site-specific license pursuant to the requirements of 10 CPR 72. 
Environmental Characteristics of the Site 
The power plant site is a 143-acre parcel located on the shore of Humboldt Bay just east of the 
community of .King Salmon (see Exhibit 2- Site Plan & ISPSI Layout). Several types ofhabitat 
exist on and near the site, with the most prominent being those associated with the Bay's open 
waters, tidal mudflats, and tidal marshes. The site itself consists largely of former coastal terrace 
prairie that has been substantially disturbed due to the long-term presence ofthe power plant. 
The site extends along several hundred feet of shoreline, most of which includes riprap that has 
been placed to protect the power plant. Some portions of the site extend about 150 feet onto the 
intertidal mudflats of Humboldt Bay. The site also includes a canal that carries bay water used to 
cool the power plant from an entrance point in King Salmon, and a discharge canal that carries 
water from the power plant cooling system to the Bay on the north end of the site. To the north 
and east of the power plant lies an extensive area oftidal marsh bisected by a rail line. 
The proposed ISPSI would be located on a coastal bluff about 400 feet northwest of the power 
plant. The bluff rises about 60 feet above Humboldt Bay at its highest point. It was partially 
developed as the location of oil tanks formerly used by the power plant and now consists of some 
remnant structures, a service road, and disturbed habitat. Areas proposed to be used for loading 
the spent fuel, transporting it, and storing it are all developed or previously-disturbed sites within 
the power plant complex and are not expected to result in direct disturbance to sensitive habitats. 
Characteristics of the ISFSI 
Once removed from a power plant, spent fuel is generally stored in wet storage pools for at least 
five years to allow it to "cool" sufficiently. It may then be moved to other forms of storage, such 
as an ISPSI. The material stored in the pool at the HBPP has been in place since about 1976. 
There are several types of ISPSI designs, with most being a variation of different types of storage 
casks bolted to a thick concrete pad within a secured area. The storage casks are generally multi-
layer containers made of concrete, steel, and other metals that contain most of the radioactivity 
being generated by the spent fuel. The casks to be used at the Humboldt ISPSI are "Multi-
Purpose Canisters" in that they are intended for both storage and transport of the nuclear 
material. The ISPSI would have six casks - five for spent fuel, and one for "Greater Than Class 
C" waste. 
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The ISFSI design at the Humboldt Bay plant would differ from most other ISFSis in that the 
storage casks would be stored below grade. This would improve the ISFSI's response during 
seismic events, would provide better security, and would reduce dose limits of radioactivity at 
the site boundary. The shielding provided by the earth would allow continued use of the nearby 
public accessway along the Humboldt Bay shoreline. 
To date, the NRC has licensed over 30 ISFSis at nuclear power plants around the county, and is 
reviewing applications for several more. Many power plants have constructed ISFSis to provide 
additional storage in their wet storage pools for ongoing power plant operations. At the HBPP, 
there is no additional spent fuel being produced, but PG&E is proposing the ISFSI in part to 
allow decommissioning of the power plant complex. 
Main Project Elements 
The initial loading of the casks would be done at the wet storage pool, which is located in the 
refueling building adjacent to the power plant. The storage casks would be lowered into the pool 
and loaded with the spent fuel assemblies. After loading, they would be removed from the pool, 
the water drained from the casks, the air inside replaced with helium, and they be welded shut. 
The casks would then be loaded onto a transporter vehicle, which is a large tracked vehicle built 
specifically to transport storage casks. PG&E plans to use the same transporter used at the ISFSI 
being built at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant. The transporter would be shipped in parts by 
road to the HBPP site. The transporter would use an existing road from the power plant to the 
top of the bluff for moving the casks to the storage site. The road was used in the past as a 
service road for the tanks formerly used to store fuel for the power plant. It would be widened 
by about eight feet to accommodate the transporter. 
The storage area would be built near the top of the on-site coastal bluff, known locally as Buhne 
Point. The casks would be stored in a six-vault reinforced concrete and steel structure to be sunk 
below grade. The surface of this structure would cover an area about 20 feet wide and 76 feet 
long and would be about flush with the existing grade (See Exhibit 3 - Site Plan & ISFSI 
Layout). The structures would be surrounded by a chain-link security fence around a 60-by-128 
foot perimeter with lighting and surveillance equipment. There would be a 20-by-40-foot 
security building about 20 feet high located at the southeast comer of this fence. 
The ISFSI would also result in an outer security zone of at least 100 meters, known as the 
"owner-controlled area". The size of this area is regulated pursuant to 10 CFR 72.106, which 
establishes federal requirements for a secure area around an ISFSI. These requirements are 
, based primarily on limiting an individual's exposure to the radiation from the stored fuel, and 
currently include a requirement that the minimum distance from the stored waste to the boundary 
be at least 100 meters. As shown on the site plan (Exhibit 2- Site Plan and ISFSI Layout), this 
area would extend through the existing public access trail and into the waters of Humboldt Bay. 
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The total area of the ISFSI, when complete, would be about 8400 square feet, including the 
security building and the area within the inner security fence, and about 6.5 acres within the 100-
meter controlled area. The road improvements would represent about 10,000 square feet of 
additional impervious surface on the power plant site. The soil removed during ISFSI 
construction would be place in a spoils area of about 9,000 square feet adjacent to the power 
plant, which would be graded and vegetated to minimize runoff and sedimentation. 
Project Decommissioning 
If another facility becomes available for spent fuel storage, the casks from the ISFSI could be 
relocated and the ISFSI could be decommissioned. The casks are designed to be suitable for 
transport offsite if necessary. Decommissioning would occur only after all fuel is removed from 
the site and would involve decontamination and disposal of the remaining materials as 
appropriate. The current proposed project does not address decommissioning due in part to the 
uncertainty about when or if it would occur and how it would be regulated at that time. 
Decommissioning would require either a new coastal development permit or an amendment to 
this permit. 
Additionally, and as noted above, PG&E is proposing the ISFSI in part to allow the retired 
nuclear power unit to be decommissioned. PG&E is also requesting proposals to provide 
replacement power for the 135 megawatts currently provided by the HBPP's two natural gas-
fired units. The request specifies that the source of replacement power be located in Humboldt 
County. If the replacement power were provided by a facility to be built at the current power 
plant site, it would likely require additional Commission review and may be subject to any NRC-
imposed safety and security requirements necessary during decommissioning and the ongoing 
presence of the ISFSI. 
4.3 COASTAL COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
Permit Jurisdiction 
The project is entirely within the coastal zone and within the Commission's retained jurisdiction. 
The only necessary permit from local government is a building permit from Humboldt County, 
which PG&E will obtain prior to construction. 
The operations of the existing power plant are regulated in part through a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by the North Coast Regional Water 
Quality Control Board. PG&E's NPDES permit allows discharges of up to about 80 million 
gallons per day from the power plant, as well as variable discharges for storm water. The two 
operating gas-powered generating units at the power plant are permitted to use about 76 million 
gallons per day of bay water for cooling. About 7,000 gallons per day are discharged from the 
area of the nuclear unit and wet storage area, which would be reduced upon completion ofthe 
ISFSI and the subsequent decommissioning of these facilities. 
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Discharges during construction of the ISFSI will likely require either a modification to the 
HBPP's NPDES permit or a Construction Stormwater Permit from the Regional Board. Once 
the ISFSI is constructed, any stormwater discharges from the project area would be incorporated 
into the power plant's NPDES permit. 
Federal permits and federal pre-emption 
The ISFSI would be subject to an NRC site-specific license. This license requires specific 
performance standards and operating conditions at the facility, including design specifications, 
testing requirements, security measures, and other measures. The license is issued for twenty 
years, with an option for the Permittee to request a license extension for an additional twenty 
years. PG&E's project description characterizes the project as a temporary facility that would be 
in place for twenty to forty years; however, as described in Section 4.4 (Other Project-Related 
Issues) below, it is anticipated that it would be in place for a much longer period. 
The NRC has exclusive jurisdiction over radiological aspects of the proposal. The state is 
preempted from imposing upon operators of nuclear facilities any regulatory requirements 
concerning radiation hazards and nuclear safety. The state may, however, impose requirements 
related to other issues. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. State 
Energy Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983), held that the federal government has 
preempted the entire field of "radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and 
operation of a nuclear plant, but that the states retain their traditional responsibility in the field of 
regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, costs, and other 
related state concerns." The facility's current and proposed possession, handling, storage, and 
transportation of spent nuclear fuel are therefore precluded from state regulation. The Coastal 
Commission findings herein address only those state concerns related to conformity to applicable 
policies of the Coastal Act, and do not evaluate or condition the proposed project with respect to 
nuclear safety or radiological issues. 
4.4 OTHER PROJECT-RELATED ISSUES 
Lack of a permanent storage facility 
The need for onsite storage of spent nuclear fuel at power plants around the country is a 
consequence of the United States not yet establishing a permanent and safe repository for spent 
fuel and other nuclear materials. In 1977, the federal government announced it would take on 
the responsibility for spent fuel from all nuclear power plants in the U.S. In 1982, the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act required the Department of Energy to accept spent fuel for permanent disposal 
by 1998. In 1987, after studies of several potential sites, the Act was amended to make a site at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada the only site undergoing further consideration. Spent fuel would be 
shipped to the Yucca Mountain facility from power plants around the county in priority order-
generally, the older the fuel, the earlier it would be accepted. Based on this priority system, 
material from HBPP would be among the first to be transported and stored at the Yucca 
Mountain site. 
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Since that time, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the NRC have conducted numerous studies at Yucca Mountain and have constructed 
parts of the facility. It has not yet opened, however, due to several significant technological 
issues and court challenges. The facility was scheduled to start accepting materials in 201 0; 
however, in July 2004, a decision by the District of Columbia Circuit Court (Nuclear Energy 
Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, D.C. App. 2004, No.01-1258) found that the 
EPA had improperly set the facility's design standard well below the safety level required by 
Congress2• The court found that the EPA's use of a 1 0,000-year design standard violated a 
requirement of the 1992 Energy Policy Act that the design be based on findings and 
recommendations ofthe National Academy of Sciences, which had recommended a one million 
year design standard. The court offered two options to resolve this issue - the EPA could either 
reset its design standard to be consistent with that of the National Academy and then make 
necessary changes to the facility design, or it could wait for Congress to amend the act to 
authorize the lower standard. This court decision has resulted in significant doubt about when or 
whether the Yucca Mountain facility will open. The EPA recently announced new proposed 
standards, which are currently undergoing public review and comment; however, the issue of 
whether they are adequate remains unsettled. Additionally, there several other as-of-yet 
unresolved court cases involving Yucca Mountain related to water rights, transportation, and 
other issues, any of which could delay or prevent final approval. 
One additional uncertainty about Yucca Mountain is the amount of storage that may eventually 
be available if the facility opens. Several recent power plant re-licensings by the NRC will result 
in more spent fuel being generated than the facility was designed to hold. Congress limited 
storage at Yucca Mountain to 70,000 tons of nuclear material, which was the amount estimated 
to be generated by power plants through 2010. Since approval of the Yucca Mountain design, 
the NRC has re-licensed fifteen nuclear power plants, which extends their operating life and 
increases the amount of spent fuel they will generate. The 20-year license extension for each of 
these fifteen power plants is estimated to produce an additional 9,000 tons of high-level waste 
needing permanent storage3. This additional material will require either that Congress authorize 
Yucca Mountain be redesigned to hold more material or that the material be stored elsewhere. 
While the current priority-based system for moving material to Yucca Mountain puts the HBPP 
spent fuel near the beginning of the priority list, it is unclear whether the same criteria would be 
used by the time Yucca Mountain might open. For example, the limited storage space may result 
in changes so that other material may be moved first, such as material "hotter" than that at the 
HBPP, or material stored near large population centers. 
2 In 2002, Congress determined that the facility must meet an "individual risk standard" for exposure to radioactive 
elements "based on and consistent with" the recommendations ofthe National Academy of Sciences. The Academy 
determined that the facility required designs ensuring exposures would not be exceeded for tens to hundreds of 
thousands of years. The EPA, however, set the exposure standard at 10,000 years. The court determined the EPA's 
selection of the 10,000 year standard was not "based upon and consistent with" the recommendations ofthe National 
Academy of Sciences, as had been required by Congress. 
3 In addition, there are currently eighteen other power plants with re-licensing requests before the NRC. Approval 
of these requests would result in the need for additional permanent storage capacity for spent nuclear fuel. 
Use of ISFSis for Spent Fuel Storage 
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Because the storage anticipated at Yucca Mountain is not yet available and is uncertain to ever 
be available, the NRC and nuclear facility operators have recognized that they will need to 
provide interim storage for spent fuel at the various nuclear power plants around the country. 
The currently accepted preferred alternative for this storage are ISFSis. To date, the NRC has 
approved more than 30 ISFSis in 23 states, most of them located at the site ofthe power plant 
from which the spent fuel has been removed. In California, there are ISFSis at the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in northern San Diego County and at the Rancho Seco 
Nuclear Power Plant near Sacramento. Another ISFSI is being constructed by PG&E at the 
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant.4 
While the NRC considers wet storage pools to provide adequate safety for the stored materials, 
recent studies have identified several concerns about the use of these systems for ongoing 
storage. The National Academies, for example, have identified several safety and security risks 
associated with the pools being packed more densely than anticipated in their original designs 
and with the threats associated with possible terrorist attacks. The dry casks used in ISFSis are 
generally considered to provide an increased margin of safety- the ISFSis are an essentially 
"passive" storage system, in that they do not depend on continual maintenance required of a wet 
storage system, though they do require regular inspections. The ISFSis additionally encapsulate 
the spent fuel into hardened structures, which are less likely than the wet storage pools to be 
affected by forces such as seismic activity, terrorist attack, or other phenomena. 
Alternatives to the Proposed Project 
As part of its proposal, PG&E evaluated several alternatives to the ISFSI as proposed. These 
included shipping the material offsite, siting the ISFSI at several locations on the HBPP site, and 
considering several alternative designs for the facility. 
Of the alternative offsite locations considered, all were either unavailable or otherwise infeasible. 
Alternatives considered included: 
• Shipping the material to a reprocessing facility: There are several reprocessing facilities in 
other countries, but none in the U.S. This option was not considered viable due to several 
significant political, legal, and logistical uncertainties. 
• Shipping the material to a private storage facility: While there is one proposed private facility 
currently under consideration (at Skull Valley, Utah), there are currently none available in 
the U.S.; therefore, this alternative is infeasible. 
• Shipping the material to another nuclear power plant that had sufficient storage space: PG&E 
found that other nuclear power plants either do not have adequate storage or have not 
included in their storage licenses the possibility of accepting spent ·fuel from other power 
plants. This alternative is therefore unavailable. 
4 
The Cmrunission approved the Diablo Canyon ISFSI in December 2004 and two ISFSis at SONGS in February 
2000 and March 2001. 
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Although there are currently no offsite locations available, PG&E has stated that it will continue 
to monitor the availability of these alternatives and will evaluate the feasibility of moving the 
material if other options become available. 
In evaluating possible onsite locations for the ISFSI, PG&E considered the following criteria: 
• To meet the NRC's ALARA ("as low as is reasonably achievable") requirements.5 
• To ensure adequate size for storage, safety, and security requirements. 
• No disruption of existing power plant operations. 
• Free of known or potential geologic hazards, including landslides, debris flows, and coastal 
retreat. 
• Away from marine storm surge areas and tsunami inundation areas. 
• Suitable foundation properties, such as load bearing capacity, no liquefaction, etc. 
• Suitable access and acceptable road grades (less than 8%) and stability. 
• Minimal grading requirements and avoidance of steep topography. 
• On a previously developed area, to the extent possible, to minimize environmental impacts. 
Based on these criteria, PG&E selected five locations on the HBPP site for further evaluation. 
The site proposed in this application was chosen over the others for several key reasons: it is 
higher than the other sites and therefore less susceptible to tsunami-related hazards; it is further 
from the power plant and therefore raises fewer issues related to the logistics of 
decommissioning; its distance from the power plant allows plant personnel to work without 
unacceptable dose exposures to the ISFSI; and it raises fewer issues related to adverse geologic 
or geotechnical conditions. 
Consequences of these Issues 
The length oftime the ISFSI would remain in place depends largely on resolution of the issues 
above. The NRC's ISFSI license has a term of20 years with an option to renew for an additional 
20 years. However, because there is no resolution to the concerns about Yucca Mountain or 
about other potential sites, there is no assurance that PG&E would be able to transfer material to 
the Yucca Mountain facility or to any other facility at the end of the 20- to 40-year license 
period. The Commission must therefore presume the ISFSI would remain at this location in 
perpetuity, regardless ofthe length of its license. Without evidence of a feasible and available 
alternative for permanent storage, the Commission must presume that the facility will affect 
coastal resources for the foreseeable future, and the findings and conditions herein are based on 
this presumption. Should the situation change, the Commission recognizes that PG&E may 
request an amendment to this permit if it desires. 
5 10 CFR 72.3 defines ALARA as meaning "as low as is reasonably achievable taking into account the state of 
technology, and the economics of improvement in relation to -
(1) Benefits to the public health and safety, 
(2) Other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and 
(3) The utilization of atomic energy in the public interest." 
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4.5 CONFORMITY TO APPLICABLE POLICIES OF THE COASTAL ACT 
4.5.1 GEOLOGIC HAZARDS 
Coastal Act Section 30253 states, in relevant part: 
New development shall: 
(1) Minimize risks to life and property in areas of high geologic, flood, and fire hazard. 
(2) Assure stability and structural integrity, and neither create nor contribute 
significantly to erosion, geologic instability, or destruction of the site or surrounding 
area or in any way require the construction of protective devices that would 
substantially alter natura/landforms along bluffs and cliffs ... 
The proposed ISFSI site is located on the shoreline of Humboldt Bay, and directly opposite the 
mouth ofthe Bay. The ISFSI would be sited about 400 feet west of the power plant, on Buhne 
Point, a coastal bluff that rises about 60 feet above the Bay. This bluff consists largely of a 
marine terrace deposit known as the Hookton Formation, which is made up of poorly cemented 
sands and interbedded clays. The site is subject to several geologic hazards, including seismic 
activity, coastal erosion, tsunamis, and tsunami runup, each ofwhich is briefly summarized 
below. Exhibit 3 provides a Geotechnical Review Memorandum that describes the Commission 
staff geologist's review of the proposed project, of materials provided by PG&E, and numerous 
other documents and reports. It also summarizes his recommendations regarding the proposed 
ISFSI's conformity to Coastal Act policies related to risks from geologic hazards. 
Seismic characteristics of the site: The proposed ISFSI site is near the southern end of the 
Cascadia Subduction Zone and near a location known as the "Mendocino Triple Junction" where 
three crustal plates converge- the Pacific Plate to the south; the Gorda Plate and its extension, 
the Juan de Fuca Plate to the north; and, the North American Plate to the east. This area has been 
subject to very large earthquakes of a magnitude of about 9.0 that occur roughly every 300 to 
400 years and usually result in large tsunamis6• The last such earthquake occurred in 1700. 
The Humboldt Bay area has a substantial history of seismic activity, with more than 120 
earthquakes of over magnitude 5 recorded within 100 miles of the proposed ISFSI site and 10 
over magnitude 7. The immediate area of the proposed ISFSI include at least two active faults. 
The Buhne Point Fault lies directly under the proposed ISFSI site and surfaces about 300 feet to 
the southwest. The surface trace of the Discharge Canal Fault lies about 500 feet from the 
proposed ISFSI site. These two faults create a wedge, which is uplifted during fault movements, 
and which is largely responsible for the topography and elevation of Buhne Point. About two 
miles away is the surface trace of another fault that underlies the ISFSI site - the Little Salmon 
Fault- which is thought to rupture concurrently with the Cascadia Subduction Zone. 
6 
An earthquake's magnitude is a measure of energy released by an earthquake, as expressed on a logarithmic scale 
measuring the horizontal displacement caused by an earthquake and detected on a seismograph. A magnitude 6 
earthquake, for example, produces ten times the amount of ground shaking as a magnitude 5 earthquake. 
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Earthquakes may be rated by the amount of ground shaking they cause. 7 The Humboldt Bay 
Power Plant has experienced six earthquakes with ground motion of greater than 0.10 g. The 
relationship between an earthquake's magnitude and its rate of ground shaking is not linear. For 
example, the two quakes that produced the largest recorded ground motions at the site (0.30 g 
and 0.55 g) were of magnitude 5.3 and 5.4, respectively, while a recent magnitude 7.2 quake in 
June 2005 produced ground motion of less than 0.1 g. Additionally, earthquakes affect 
structures based on the frequency (in cycles per second) of the seismic waves they generate. 
High frequency shaking is generally more damaging to smaller, more rigid structures, and low 
frequency shaking is generally more damaging to larger or more flexible structures. 
PG&E designed the ISFSI in part using a probabilistic assessment of the "maximum credible 
earthquake" likely to occur at the site during a 2000-year return period. This design earthquake 
is of magnitude 9.1, roughly equivalent to the recent Sumatra earthquake ofDecember 2004, and 
has a peak acceleration of almost 2.9 g, which is equivalent to the force near the upper limit of 
any earthquake anywhere in the world. The Commission's staff geologist has objected to the use 
of a 2000-year return period and instead recommends the use of a 1 0,000-year return period8; 
however, the Commission concurs with his determination that the overall assessment provided 
by PG&E results in a conservative design basis for the ISFSI. The Commission therefore 
recommends that designing the ISFSI to withstand this rate of ground shaking is consistent with 
Coastal Act section 30253(1) with respect to the ground motion hazard. 
Liquefaction: Liquefaction can occur during ground shaking when loosely consolidated soils are 
saturated with water. Conditions at the ISFSI site suggest that liquefaction is not likely- the 
soils there are generally dense and stiff clays and sands of a type not subject to liquefaction. 
Additionally, Standard Penetration Tests conducted at the site showed that the soils were 
unlikely to be subject to liquefaction. 9 As a result, the Commission concurs with the conclusion 
of both the staff geologist and PG&E that liquefaction will not occur in these soils. 
7 Ground shaking is a measure of the movement caused by the earthquake compared to the rate of acceleration 
caused by gravity. "Peak ground acceleration" (PGA) can be measured as a vertical or horizontal movement. For 
example, a PGA of 0.1 g means that the ground accelerated at one-tenth the rate of acceleration resulting from 
gravity (9 .81 meters per second squared). PGA depends not only on the intensity or magnitude of an earthquake, · 
but on the distance from the quake and on characteristics of the site - for example, ground acceleration will vary 
based on the depth and firmness of soil or bedrock at the site. 
8 Exhibit 5 includes an October 2002 letter from the Executive Director to the NRC objecting to a proposed change 
in federal requirements that would lower the return period from 10,000 years to 2,000 years. The NRC adopted this 
change in September 2003. Exhibit 5 additionally includes a memorandum from the Commission geologist to the 
Commission explaining this change in federal nuclear safety licensing requirements. 
9 
Standard Penetration Tests involve striking a sampling tube with a standard weight hammer to determine how 
many blows it takes to drive the tube 12 inches into the soil. Generally, where the soils take 30 blows or more, 
liquefaction never occurs, and where soils take between 20 and 30 blows, liquefaction is very rare. Most of the tests 
conducted at the site resulted in counts above 30, with the rest above 20 and spatially isolated from one another. 
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Slope stability: The proposed ISFSI site is surrounded by the sloped sides ofBuhne Point. The 
bluffs to the north and west are relatively steep, and the slopes to the east and south are relatively 
gentle. PG&E assessed slope stability under static conditions and determined the factor of safety 
to be 2.69 for the north side ofthe site (the coastal bluff) and 4.94 for the southern slope. For 
most coastal developments, a safety factor of at least 1.5 is considered necessary to ensure slope 
stability for the life of a proposed project. As discussed under "coastal erosion"~ however, this 
level of stability cannot be assured in perpetuity if coastal erosion impinges on the site. 
The slope stability analyses indicated yield accelerations-the level of ground shaking needed to 
instigate landslides-to be 0.69g and 0.66g for the coastal bluff and the southern slope, 
respectively. Since these levels of ground shaking are less than the design basis earthquake, it is 
likely that the slopes will fail during such an earthquake. The amount of displacements of the 
slide masses was calculated using a Newmark sliding block approach to be about one foot during 
the design basis earthquake. This is far in excess of the 50 mm usually considered acceptable for 
new construction, but the applicant has indicated that the design of the ISFSI can accommodate 
this amount of displacement. 
Surface fault rupture: Several active faults underlie the site. The Little Salmon Fault, The Bay 
Entrance Fault and the Buhne Point fault all dip to the northeast and underlie the site at various 
depths. The surface trace of the Buhne Point fault lies only about 300 feet south of the ISFSI 
site, and the surface trace of the Discharge Canal fault lies about 500 feet to the north. These 
two faults define a wedge, on which the ISFSI site is located. Through movement on these 
faults, the wedge is gradually uplifted and tilted. Although trenches across the site did encounter · 
sand-filled fractures, none of them showed detectable offset and so are not considered active 
faults. PG&E believes that future deformation from displacement on the Little Salmon fault will 
be minor tilting with no differential displacements. The Commission's staff geologist agrees that 
this is likely, but additional believes it is possible that one or both of these faults will shift 
position and that future fault movement could occur at the ISFSI site. It is quite common for 
faults to rupture along traces offset from previous ruptures, defining a "fault zone" rather than a 
single fault plane. This is, in fact, the case for these two faults as well, although the zone of 
fracturing does not appear to be more than a few tens of feet wide. Further, it is possible that a 
future movement along these faults could result in a different style of faulting. Given the 
proximity of the ISFSI to these active faults, the Commission concurs with the staff geologist's 
position that during the perpetual presence of the ISFSI at this site, it will not be subjected to 
fault rupture. 
PG&E has shown evidence that large, massive structures (including ammunition bunkers, bank 
vaults, and buildings with massive foundations) have performed well in previous earthquakes in 
Taiwan, Turkey, and Nicaragua. Although these anecdotal observations are encouraging, there 
also are many examples of quite large, massive buildings being damaged by surface faulting. 
Accordingly, the Commission finds the ISFSI is not consistent with the requirement of Coastal 
Act Section 30253(1) to minimize risk with respect to surface fault rupture. 
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Tsunami: The proposed ISFSI site is within an area identified as subject to tsunami hazards. It 
is on the shoreline of Humboldt Bay and directly opposite the mouth of the Bay, so it could 
readily be subject to direct or indirect tsunami wave energy. 
PG&E assessed how the ISFSI site likely would be affected by tsunamis and tsunami runups. It 
determined that the maximum tsunami runup resulting from a Cascadian Subduction Zone 
earthquake during Mean Higher High Water would be from about 23 to 38 feet. Because the 
ISFSI site is at about 44 feet, and because it is below grade, PG&E concludes that the ISFSI 
would not be inundated and would not be damaged by debris carried by the tsunami. 
However, for several reasons, the Commission cannot conclude that the site will be safe from 
tsunami hazards either during the relatively short-term or in perpetuity. First, similarities 
between the expected Cascadian Subduction Zone earthquakes and the December 2004 Sumatran 
earthquake raise doubts as to the validity of the expected tsunami runup height at the ISFSI site. 
The Sumatran quake resulted in tsunami runups of as much as 130 feet, which is about three 
times higher than the runup predicted at the ISFSI site, but the mechanisms for the earthquakes 
and the generation of tsunamis in each area are similar. Additionally, the predicted 38-foot 
runup at the ISFSI site is based only on the height above Mean Higher High Water and does not 
include the customary additional height provided if the tsunami occurred during a 100-year 
storm surge. This would put the runup at an even higher level, possibly at or above the 44-foot 
elevation of the ISFSI structure. Further, the ISFSI site is on a peninsula made up of poorly 
consolidated soils, and it would be subject during a tsunami to wave energy from both incoming 
and retreating waves, which could result in substantial erosion and damage to the ISFSI site. 
Finally, because the ISFSI is expected to remain in perpetuity, Commission staff requested 
PG&E evaluate the longer-term potential for tsunami effects. PG&E applied the rate of tectonic 
uplift at Buhne Point (estimatedat about 1.3 feet per 100 years) to several scenarios for 
anticipated rates of sea level rise. The analyses found that during the next several thousand 
years, overtopping of the site would be likely, though over the next 10,000 years, the anticipated 
sea level will likely fall due to increased glaciation and that ISFSI site would become less 
exposed to risks associated with sea level rise or tsunamis. Therefore, based on the above, the 
Commission finds that the siting of the ISFSI is inconsistent with the requirement of Section 
30253(1) to minimize risks associated with tsunamis and tsunami runup. 
Coastal Erosion: Section 30253(2) of the Coastal Act requires, in part, that new development 
not require the construction of protective devices that would substantially alter natural landforms 
along bluffs and cliffs. The ISFSI site is in an area where historic coastal erosion rates have been 
among the highest in the state. This has been due in part to its location relative to the two jetties 
that were built to maintain the mouth of Humboldt Bay, but which also act to direct wave energy 
towards the site. PG&E's assessment ofhistorical shoreline retreat in the area between 1858 and 
2000 shows that the shoreline retreated between 1248 to 1485 feet. The rate of retreat during this 
period was highly variable- for example, between 1858 and 1870, shoreline retreat averaged 24 
to 35 feet per year; between 1870 and 1942, it averaged 4 to 9 feet per year; and from 1942 to 
1959, it averaged 44 to 65 feet per year. Since 1952, however, the site has been protected by a 
riprap revetment built to protect the power plant. The revetment was enlarged in 1956-57 and 
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was repaired in 1989 after being damaged in winter storms. The revetment has essentially halted 
retreat of the shoreline. However, the bluff above the revetment has continued to retreat, at a rate 
of roughly one to four inches per year. It will likely continue to retreat until it attains a stable 
slope angle. 
The slope stability analyses assume the current configuration of the bluff. Even with modest 
bluff retreat, such as is predicted even in the presence of the current revetment, the static factor 
of safety and the expected seismic displacement will be lower and higher, respectively, than the 
calculations presented by PG&E. This site is only protected from coastal erosion by a revetment 
that has required extensive maintenance in the past, and will only remain safe in the future with 
continued maintenance and, perhaps, expansion of the coastal armoring. 
Further, given future sea level rise, overtopping of the existing revetment and erosion of the 
upper bluff by direct wave attack is likely within the next several hundred years. Accordingly, it 
seems likely that stability of the ISFSI will require the construction of some type of upper bluff 
shoreline protection device. To better assess the rate of erosion of both the bluff and the 
shoreline, and to provide adequate time to plan for, design, and implement any necessary 
shoreline protection, Special Conditions 1 and 2 would require PG&E to monitor erosion and to 
report to the Executive Director when erosion would cause a threat to the ISFSI' s stability. 
Conclusion 
The site and proposed development are likely to be subject to severe ground shaking, surface 
fault rupture, slope failures, tsunamis, and coastal erosion. While PG&E believes that the ISFSI 
design is adequate to withstand these hazards, the Commission finds that siting the ISFSI at this 
location does not fully conform to the requirement ,of Section 30253(1) that new development 
minimize risks to life and property. Further, even with the existing revetment and with the two 
Special Conditions, the combination of bluff erosion and of sea level rise over the next several 
decades will likely require construction of additional shoreline protection on the bluff to protect 
the ISFSI, and the Commission finds the ISFSI would be inconsistent with the requirement of 
Section 30253(2) that new development not require shoreline protective structures during its 
anticipated operating life. 
However, although siting the facility at this location results in inconsistencies with Sections 
30253(1) and (2), to deny the proposed project or to modify it to remove these inconsistencies 
would result in effects on coastal resources that conflict with other Chapter 3 policies. The 
Commission must resolve these inconsistencies by applying Coastal Act Section 30007.5, as is 
described below in Section 4.5.6 of this report. 
4.5.2 VISUAL RESOURCES 
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Coastal Act Section 30251 states, in relevant part: 
The scenic and visual qualities of coastal areas shall be considered and protected as a 
resource of public importance. Permitted development shall be sited anidesigned to 
protect views to and along the ocean and scenic coastal areas, to minimize the alteration 
of natural/and forms, to be visually compatible with the character of surrounding areas, 
and, where feasible, to restore and enhance visual quality in visually degraded areas ... 
The ISFSI would be located near the top of a coastal bluff about 150 feet from the shoreline of 
Humboldt Bay. The storage structure would be constructed below grade and would not be 
visible from nearby public areas or coastal waters; however, the ISFSI would also include a new 
security building, a new fence, and associated lighting and security equipment, all located near 
the top of a visually prominent coastal bluff. Although these project elements are similar to 
those currently in place at the power plant, the ISFSI would represent an expansion of those 
effects into a new area visible from public viewpoints on the adjacent coastal waters, from parts 
of the nearby community of King Salmon, and from public roads. These areas are valued in part 
for their views of the Bay, for wildlife and bird watching, and for other activities done in part in 
appreciation of the scenic qualities ofHumboldt Bay. 
These project elements are necessary parts of the ISFSI's safety and security measures pursuant 
to NRC requirements. However, to reduce the project's impacts on visual resources, Special 
Condition #3 would require PG&E to use neutral tones on all visible structures at the ISFSI and 
would require PG&E to direct all necessary lighting downward and inward to the extent allowed 
by NRC security requirements. 
Conclusion 
Even with this Special Condition, however, the ISFSI's location on a visually prominent bluff 
would interrupt views to and along the scenic coastal waters and shoreline of Humboldt Bay. 
The Commission therefore finds the project would be inconsistent with the requirement of 
Section 30251 that development be sited and designed to protect views to and along the ocean 
and scenic coastal areas. Additionally, although siting the ISFSI at this location results in an 
inconsistency with Section 30251, to deny the proposed project or to modify it to remove this 
inconsistency would result in effects on coastal resources that conflict with other Coastal Act 
policies, including Sections 30230 & 30231 (marine resources and water quality), and 30240 
(environmentally sensitive habitat areas). There are no measures available that would allow full 
consistency with Section 30251 and the other applicable Coastal Act policies. The Commission 
must therefore resolve this conflict by applying Coastal Act Sections 30007.5 and 30200(b), 
which is discussed below in Section 4.5.6 of this report. 
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4.5.3 MARINE RESOURCES AND WATER QUALITY 
Coastal Act Section 30230 states: 
Marine resources shall be maintained, enhanced, and where feasible, restored. Special 
protection shall be given to areas and species of special biological or economic 
significance. Uses of the marine environment shall be carried out in a manner that will 
sustain the biological productivity of coastal waters and that will maintain healthy 
populations of all species of marine organisms adequate for long-term commercial, 
recreational, scientific, and educational purposes. 
Coastal Act Section 30231 states: 
The biological productivity and the quality of coastal waters, streams, wetlands, 
estuaries, and lakes appropriate to maintain optimum populations of marine organisms 
and for the protection of human health shall be maintained and, where feasible, restored 
through, among other means, minimizing adverse effects of waste water discharges and 
entrainment, controlling runoff, preventing depletion of ground water supplies and 
substantial interference with surface water flow, encouraging waste water reclamation, 
maintaining natural vegetation buffer areas that protect riparian habitats, and 
minimizing alteration of natural streams. 
Background 
The ISFSI would be built about 150 feet from Humboldt Bay and would involve vegetation 
removal, grading and excavation, road construction, soil removal and stockpiling, and placement 
of new impervious surfaces at the power plant site. The HPBB is currently subject to an NPDES 
permit issued by the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board. The permit includes 
conditions related to allowable amounts of intake water from the Bay, allowable volumes and 
types of non-radiological discharges from the various facilities on the site, and other measures 
meant to prevent adverse impacts to coastal waters.10 
Construction of the ISFSI would be subject to additional review and possible permitting by the 
North Coast Regional Water Quality Board for conformity to requirements for construction 
stormwater. These discharges are subject to Best Management Practices to avoid and minimize 
adverse effects to nearby waterbodies. Most project activities would take place in areas where 
much of the runoff is currently subject to Best Management Practices and other water quality 
control measures. Ongoing operation of the ISFSI would result in minor changes to the drainage 
patterns and storm water runoff from the site. The facility's NPDES permit would likely be 
modified to incorporate any discharges related to the ISFSI. Additionally, when the existing wet 
10 
As noted previously, Storage and use of hazardous radioactive materials, including the spent fuel, is subject to the 
requirements of the NRC. State and local governments are pre-empted by federal law from regulating activities 
related to nuclear safety and radiological hazards. Similarly, the design elements of the ISFSI related to nuclear 
safety and radiological hazards are subject solely to requirements imposed by the federal government. 
Staff Report E-05-001 (Pacific Gas & Electric Company) 
August 31, 2005 
Page24of38 
storage pool is decommissioned as a result of this project, overall discharges from the power 
plant are expected to decrease by about 7,000 gallons per day. With these Best Management 
Practices and water quality measures in place, normal ISFSI operations are not expected to 
adversely affect marine resources or coastal water quality, and with decommissioning of part of 
the power plant, may allow improvements to water quality. 
Construction of the ISFSI also involves removal of soil due to widening the road and 
constructing the storage site. The removed soils are proposed to be stored on an approximately 
9,000 square-foot site near the power plant. To ensure these soils are managed to reduce runoff 
and sedimentation and to prevent adverse effects to nearby wetland areas, Special Condition #4 
would require that this soil be graded to minimize runoff and sedimentation into nearby coastal 
waters and that it be vegetated with non-invasive species pursuant to a plan subject to approval 
by the Executive Director. 
Conclusions 
Based on the above, the Commission finds that the project, as conditioned, conforms to the 
policies of Coastal Act Sections 30230 and 30231. 
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4.5.4 ENVIRONMENT ALLY SENSITIVE HABIT AT AREAS 
Coastal Act Section 30240(b) states: 
Development in areas adjacent to environmentally sensitive habitat areas and parks and 
recreation areas shall be sited and designed to prevent impacts which would significantly 
degrade those areas, and shall be compatible with the continuance of those habitat and 
recreation areas. 
Much of the HBPP site is former coastal prairie terrace, although the power plant's presence 
during the past nearly fifty years has resulted in significant areas of development, impervious 
surfaces, and other disturbances on the site. Nearby however, are extensive coastal marshes, 
primarily to the north and east, and the waters and shoreline of Humboldt Bay. 
The ISFSI would be built on a previously disturbed site at the power plant. The site is near the 
oil tanks formerly used to fuel the power plant and near the road between the power plant and the 
tanks. The ISFSI site is vegetated primarily with ruderal or introduced species. The spoils site 
would be on a grassy area near the power plant. 
In 1999 and 2002, PG&E conducted site surveys for sensitive species, including terrestrial and 
marine plants and animals. While none were found during the surveys, there are several areas at 
the power plant site that could provide suitable habitat for such species. Habitat at or near the 
site is considered suitable for several special-status fish species, including Chinook salmon, coho 
salmon, steelhead, coastal cutthroat trout, and tidewater goby, and several freshwater aquatic 
species, including northern red-legged frog, foothill yellow-legged frog, tailed frog, southern 
torrent salamander, and the northwestern pond turtle. As noted above, none of these species 
were observed on site, and construction and operation of the ISFSI is not expected to adversely 
affect the species or the habitat listed above. 
Indirect impacts to the nearby environmentally sensitive habitat areas due to runoff and noise are 
not expected to cause adverse impacts. Runoff would be controlled through Best Management 
Practices required as part of the power plant's NPDES permits, and noise levels during 
construction are expected to be similar to levels already emanating from the operating power 
plant site. Soil removed to construct the ISFSI would be stored at a previously disturbed area 
near the power plant, accessible by an existing road. These soils would be graded and 
revegetated to reduce impacts due to sedimentation and runoff. 
Conclusion 
Based on the above, the Commission finds that the project conforms to the policies of Coastal 
Act Section 30240(b ). 
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4.5.5 PUBLIC ACCESS AND RECREATION 
Coastal Act Section 30210 states: 
In carrying out the requirement of Section 4 of Article X of the California Constitution, 
maximum access, which shall be conspicuously posted, and recreational opportunities 
shall be provided for all the people consistent with public safety needs and the need to 
protect public rights, rights of private property owners, and natural resource areas from 
overuse. 
Coastal Act Section 30211 states: 
Development shall not interfere with the public's right of access to the sea where 
acquired through use or legislative authorization, including, but not limited to, the use of 
dry sand and rocky coastal beaches to the first line of terrestrial vegetation. 
Coastal Act Section 30212(a) states: 
Public access from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline and along the coast shall 
be provided in new development projects except where: (1) It is inconsistent with public 
safety, military security needs, or the protection of fragile coastal resources, (2) 
Adequate access exists nearby, or, (3) Agriculture would be adversely affected. 
Dedicated accessway shall not be required to be opened to public use until a public 
agency or private association agrees to accept responsibility for maintenance and 
liability of the accessway. 
Coastal Act Section 30214 states: 
(a) The public access policies of this article shall be implemented in a manner that takes into 
account the need to regulate the time, place, and manner of public access depending on 
the facts and circumstances in each case including, but not limited to, the following: 
(1) Topographic and geologic site characteristics. 
(2) The capacity of the site to sustain use and at what level of intensity. 
(3) The appropriateness of limiting public access to the right to pass and repass 
depending on such factors as the fragility of the natural resources in the area and the 
proximity of the access area to adjacent residential uses. 
(4) The need to provide for the management of access areas so as to protect the privacy 
of adjacent property owners and to protect the aesthetic values of the area by 
providing for the collection of litter . 
....... -------------
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(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the public access policies of this article be carried 
out in a reasonable manner that considers the equities and that balances the rights of the 
individual property owner with the public's constitutional right of access pursuant to 
Section 4 of Article X of the California Constitution. Nothing in this section or any 
amendment thereto shall be construed as a limitation on the rights guaranteed to the 
public under Section 4 of Article X of the California Constitution. 
(c) In carrying out the public access policies of this article, the commission and any other 
responsible public agency shall consider and encourage the utilization of innovative 
access management techniques, including, but not limited to, agreements with private 
organizations which would minimize management costs and encourage the use of 
volunteer programs. 
Coastal Act 30220 states: 
Coastal areas suited for water-oriented recreational activities that cannot readily be 
provided at inland water areas shall be protected for such uses. 
Coastal Act Section 30221 states: 
Oceanfront land suitable for recreational use shall be protected for recreational use and 
development unless present and foreseeable future demand for public or commercial 
recreational activities that could be accommodated on the property is already adequately 
provided for in the area. 
Coastal Act Section 30234.5 states: 
The economic, commercial, and recreational importance of fishing activities shall be 
recognized and protected. 
Coastal Act Section 30252 states: 
The location and amount of new development should maintain and enhance public access 
to the coast by (1) facilitating the provision or extension of transit service, (2) providing 
commercial facilities within or adjoining residential development or in other areas that 
will minimize the use of coastal access roads, (3) providing nonautomobile circulation 
within the development, (4) providing adequate parking facilities or providing substitute 
means of serving the development with public transportation, (5) assuring the potential 
for public transit for high intensity uses such as high-rise office buildings, and by (6) 
assuring that the recreational needs of new residents will not overload nearby coastal 
recreation areas by correlating the amount of development with local park acquisition 
and development plans with the provision of onsite recreational facilities to serve the new 
development. 
------------....... 
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Coastal Act policies generally require that developments such as the proposed ISFSI, located 
adjacent to the shoreline in an area with ongoing public use, not interfere with that use and 
provide access to the shoreline. In addition to the applicable Coastal Act policies, and pursuant 
to state and federal law, public access established as part of a permit decision must generally be 
based on an appropriate nexus between the proposed project's effects on access and the measures 
taken to establish access -that is, there must be a credible relationship between any loss of 
access caused by the project and the measures required to replace or regain that access. Further, 
those measures must be roughly proportional to the effects of a project. 
Background and Existing Access 
The ISFSI would share the 143-acre site of the existing PG&E power plant. It would be located 
about 400 feet northwest of the power plant and about 150 feet from Humboldt Bay. Public 
access along the shoreline is currently provided on the power plant site on a path and on the 
riprap placed to protect the power plant. There is a gate across the western end of this 
accessway, which is kept open at all times except during operations at the power plant where 
safety or security measures require it to be closed. The access provided along the shoreline, 
however, has not yet been established or protected by a deed restriction or easement. 
The existing access area is used largely for low-intensity recreational uses, such as saltwater 
fishing, bird and wildlife watching, and scenic enjoyment of the Bay. The closest nearby coastal 
access points include a beach and picnic area at King Salmon, a boat launch at Field's Landing 
about a mile south of the site, and the Elk River Wildlife Area Viewpoint about a mile to the 
north. This shoreline along the power plant site is also described as an important link in the 
proposed implementation of the Humboldt Bay Trails Feasibility Study, prepared in 2001 by the 
Redwood Community Action Agency with funding from the California Coastal Conservancy. 
This study describes a system of trails and public accessways around Humboldt Bay, which 
includes shoreline access along the power plant site that would connect with a trail in King 
Salmon to the west and with a trail along the railroad to the north of the power plant. 
Coastal Access Required Due to the Development 
Development of the ISFSI would result in two security zones around the storage area. The 
innermost area would cover about 8000 square feet on the top of the bluff and would be 
protected by a chain link security fence and surveillance and monitoring equipment. The outer 
area, known as a "controlled area", is currently required by the NRC to extend a minimum of 
100 meters in all directions from the ISFSI. The NRC requires that licensees have the ability to 
limit, but not necessary prohibit, access within this zone. Most of this controlled area around the 
ISFSI would be within the PG&E site, but it would include about 500 feet of the existing lateral 
access along the shoreline and would extend into Humboldt Bay to include just less than an acre 
of coastal waters . 
........ ------------
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Development of the ISFSI would include adding a fence and gate in this area to provide 
additional controls on public access within 100 meters of the ISFSI during some periods of 
project construction and operation. PG&E states that the gate is to be kept open except during 
very limited times when required for security and safety reasons. These closures are described as 
being during the time spent fuel casks would be loaded into the ISFSI storage area, which PG&E 
estimates would take about a week, and in the event of an ISFSI emergency or if casks need to be 
removed from the storage area for maintenance. ·However, PG&E characterizes these two latter 
events as highly unlikely. Providing continued public access to this area is therefore consistent 
with required NRC safety and security measures. 
The ISFSI would result in further limitations on access due to the uncertainty about whether a 
permanent storage facility will be available to replace the ISFSI at the end of its 20- to 40-year 
license period. With that uncertainty, the ongoing presence of the facility must be expected to 
result in the exclusion zone remaining for the foreseeable future. As described in Section 4.5.1 
above, expected changes to the site include inland movement of the shoreline due to phenomena 
such as coastal erosion and sea level rise. These changes would affect access at some point, 
either by the need to place additional shoreline stabilization structures to protect the ISFSI or by 
movement of the shoreline closer to the ISFSI and its inner security zone, which would result in 
public access being "squeezed out" of this section of the shoreline. 
Special Condition #5 would address these effects in several ways. It would require PG&E to 
establish the accessway through use of a deed restriction that ensured public access to the 
shoreline would remain, and that the accessway would move in concert with the shoreline. It 
would also require PG&E to provide several basic improvements to the existing accessway, such 
as an even walking surface, signage, and similar elements. It would further require PG&E to 
request from the Commission a permit amendment when changes to the accessway conditions, 
such as the expected environmental changes (e.g., coastal erosion, sea level rise, etc.) or changes 
in regulations, ownership, or other administrative elements, would reduce public access to the 
shoreline. 
Conclusion 
Based on the discussion above, the Commission finds that the project, with the inclusion of 
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4.5.6 RESOLVING POLICY CONFLICTS 
Coastal Act Section 30007.5 states: 
The Legislature further finds and recognizes that conflicts may occur between one or 
more policies of the division. The Legislature therefore declares that in carrying out the 
provisions of this division such conflicts be resolved in a manner which on balance is the 
most protective of significant coastal resources. In this context, the Legislature declares 
that broader policies which, for example, serve to concentrate development in close 
proximity to urban and employment centers may be more protective, overall, than 
specific wildlife habitat and other similar resource policies. 
Coastal Act Section 30200(b) states: 
Where the commission or any local government in implementing the provisions of this 
division identifies a conflict between the policies of this chapter, Section 30007.5 shall be 
utilized to resolve the conflict and the resolution of such conflicts shall be supported by 
appropriate findings setting forth the basis for the resolution of identified policy conflicts. 
As noted previously in this report, the proposed ISFSI is inconsistent with Sections 30253(1)-(2) 
(geologic hazards) and Section 30251 (visual resources) ofthe Coastal Act. However, as 
explained below, denying or modifying the proposed project to eliminate these inconsistencies 
would lead to nonconformity to other Coastal Act policies, namely Sections 30230, 30231 
(marine biology and water quality}, and 30240 (environmentally sensitive habitat areas). 
Regarding its inconsistency with Section 30253{1)-(2), even though the ISFSI's proposed 
location is the most suitable of the feasible and available sites for reducing geologic risks, 
approving the ISFSI at this location would not be fully consistent with the requirements of 
Section 30253(1) to minimize those risks. The ISFSI would be located at a site subject to 
geologic risks associated with seismic activity, tsunami, surface rupture, coastal erosion, and sea 
level rise. Even with design measures to reduce the risks associated with these hazards, the 
ISFSI' s location does not minimize those risks and it is therefore inconsistent with Section 
30253{1 ). Additionally, the perpetual presence of the ISFSI at this location would require 
construction of additional shoreline protection during the life of the project, which conflicts with 
the requirement of Section 30253(2) that new development not require protective structures that 
would substantially alter natural landforms along bluffs and cliffs. Regarding its inconsistency 
with Section 30251, the ISFSI is proposed to be sited near the top of a coastal bluff, as this is the 
most suitable site for reducing risks from geologic hazards, though approving it at this location 
would not protect views to and along the ocean, which would make it inconsistent with that 
requirement of the Coastal Act's visual resource policy. 
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However, denying the ISFSI on the basis ofthese inconsistencies would result in the continued 
presence of the existing storage facility, which would likely result in significant adverse impacts 
to marine biology, water quality, and environmentally sensitive habitat areas caused by the same 
geologic hazards that make the blufftop a safer location than the existing storage pool. In such a 
situation, when a proposed project is inconsistent with a Chapter 3 policy, and denial or 
modification of the project would be inconsistent with another policy, Section 30007.5 of the 
Coastal Act provides for resolution of such a policy conflict. 
Applying Section 30007.5 
As indicated previously, the standard of review for the Commission's decision on a coastal 
development permit in the Commission's retained jurisdiction is whether the proposed project is 
consistent with the Chapter 3 policies of the Coastal Act. In general, a proposal must be 
consistent with all relevant policies in order to be approved. If a proposal is inconsistent with 
one or more policies, it must normally be denied or conditioned to make it consistent with all 
relevant policies. 
However, the Legislature recognized through Sections 30007.5 and 30200(b) that conflicts can 
occur among those policies. It therefore declared that when the Commission identifies a conflict 
among the policies of Chapter 3, the conflict is to be resolved "in a manner which on balance is 
the most protective of significant coastal resources", pursuant to Coastal Act Section 30007.5. 
Resolving conflicts through application of Section 30007.5 involves the following seven steps, 
each of which is explained in greater detail below, followed by how each applies to the proposed 
ISFSI project: 
1) The project, as proposed, is inconsistent with at least one Chapter 3 policy; 
2) The project, if denied or modified to eliminate the inconsistency, would affect coastal 
resources in a manner inconsistent with at least one other Chapter 3 policy that 
affirmatively requires protection or enhancement of those resources; 
3) The project, if approved, would be fully consistent with the policy that affirmatively 
mandates resource protection or enhancement; 
4) The project, if approved, would result in tangible resource enhancement over existing 
conditions; 
5) The benefits of the project are not independently required by some other body oflaw; 
6) The benefits of the project must result from the main purpose of the project, rather than 
from an ancillary component appended to the project to "create a conflict"; and, 
7) There are no feasible alternatives that would achieve the objectives of the project without 
violating any Chapter 3 policies. 
1) The project, as proposed, is inconsistent with at least one Chapter 3 policy: 
For the Commission to apply Section 30007.5, a proposed project must be inconsistent with 
an applicable Chapter 3 policy. In the case of this proposed ISFSI, the inconsistency is with 
Sections 30253(1)-(2) and 30251. 
------------........ 
______________ ....... 
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2) The project, if denied or modified to eliminate the inconsistency, would affect coastal 
resources in a manner inconsistent with at least one other Chapter 3 policy that 
affirmatively requires protection or enhancement of those resources: 
A true conflict between Chapter 3 policies results from a proposed project which is 
inconsistent with one or more policies, and for which denial or modification of the project 
would be inconsistent with at least one other Chapter 3 policy. Further, the policy 
inconsistency that would be caused by denial or modification must be with a policy that 
affirmatively mandates protection or enhancement of certain coastal resources. Denial ofthe 
ISFSI would be inconsistent with three policies of this type -Section 30230, which requires, 
in part, that "Marine resources shall be protected for such uses"; Section 30231, which 
requires, in part, that biological productivity "shall be maintained"; and Section 30240, 
which requires, in part, that environmentally sensitive habitat areas "shall be protected 
against any significant disruption of habitat values" [emphasis added in each]. In most 
cases, denying a proposed project will not cause adverse effects on coastal resources for 
which the Coastal Act mandates protection or enhancement, but will simply maintain the 
status quo. Where denial of a project would result in such effects, as with this ISFSI, a 
conflict between or among two or more Coastal Act policies is presented. 
3) The project, if approved, would be fully consistent with the policy that affirmatively 
mandates resource protection or enhancement: 
For denial of a project to be inconsistent with a Chapter 3 policy, the proposed project would 
have to protect or enhance the resource values for which the applicable Coastal Act policy 
includes an affirmative mandate. That is, if denial of a project would conflict with an 
affirmatively mandated Coastal Act policy, approval of the project would have to conform to 
that policy. If the Commission were to interpret this conflict resolution provision otherwise, 
then any proposal, no matter how inconsistent with Chapter 3, that offered a slight 
incremental improvement over existing conditions could result in a conflict that would allow 
the use of Section 30007.5. The Commission concludes that the conflict resolution 
provisions were not intended to apply to such minor incremental improvements. 
Because the ISFSI storage casks are designed to prevent the releases that would adversely 
affect the biological resources mentioned above, the project, as proposed and conditioned, is 
therefore fully consistent with Coastal Act Sections 30230, 30231, and 30240. 
4) The project, if approved, would result in tangible resource enhancement over existing 
conditions: 
This aspect of the conflict between policies may be looked at from two perspectives- either 
approval of the project would result in improved conditions for a coastal resource subject to 
an affirmative mandate, or denial or modification of the project would result in continued 
degradation of that resource . 
........ ------------
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Approval of the ISFSI would result in removal of hazardous material from the wet storage 
pool to a location less susceptible to expected events that would cause releases in violation of 
the Coastal Act's marine resource, water quality, and ESHA policies. It would also result in 
overall significantly lower risks associated with geologic hazards than the current storage 
system. The ISFSI would be at a higher elevation, making it less susceptible to tsunamis, 
and it would be on a site not prone to liquefaction. The nuclear material stored in the ISFSI 
would be in a more stable configuration for safety during seismic events. Further, 
implementing the ISFSI would allow PG&E to continue the decommissioning process at the 
power plant, resulting in eventual removal of the wet storage system and the nuclear unit 
from a location highly susceptible to those expected events. 
Denial of the ISFSI would result in the continued operation of the wet storage pool and the 
continued higher risks associated with its response to expected geologic events, including 
tsunamis and seismic movement. But for the ISFSI, the storage pool and its contents would 
be expected to remain at the site for the foreseeable future. During that time, it is probable 
that any or all of several events could occur that would be of sufficient magnitude to 
adversely affect the pool and its contents- an earthquake above the design limits of the 
facility, a tsunami, coastal erosion, or sea level rise. Any of these events would likely result 
in damage or destruction of the storage pool and release of debris and its contents to the 
marine waters and tidal wetlands adjacent to the power plant, which would be inconsistent 
with Coastal Act policies established to protect marine life, water quality, and sensitive 
habitat areas. Similarly, while modifying the ISFSI by siting it at one of the alternative 
onsite locations would lead to fewer visual impacts, those locations would not result in 
minimization of the geologic risks and would not fully comply with the policies to protect 
biological resources. Therefore, either denial or modification of the ISFSI would conflict 
with the policies of Sections 30230, 30231, and 30240. 
5) The benefits of the project are not independently required by some other body of law: 
The benefits that would cause denial of the project to be inconsistent with a Chapter 3 policy 
cannot be those that the project proponent is already being required to provide pursuant to 
another agency's directive under another body oflaw. In other words, ifthebenefits would 
be provided regardless of the Commission's action on the proposed project, the project 
proponent cannot seek approval of an otherwise-unapprovable project on the basis that the 
project would produce those benefits. In essence, the project proponent does not get credit 
for resource enhancements that it is already being compelled to provide. In the case of this 
ISFSI, PG&E is proposing the project in part to support its ongoing efforts to decommission 
the HBPP nuclear unit and associated facilities, and in part because it would be less 
expensive to operate and maintain than the wet storage pool. While PG&E must obtain 
approvals for the ISFSI from both the Coastal Commission and the NRC, this type of storage 
system is not being mandated by the NRC or any other regulatory body and PG&E could 
choose to maintain its existing system. 
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6) The benefits of the project must result from the main purpose of the project, rather 
than from an ancillary component appended to the project to "create a conflict": 
A project's benefits to coastal resources must be integral to the project purpose. If a project 
is inconsistent with a Chapter 3 policy, and the main elements of the project do not result in 
the cessation of ongoing degradation of a resource the Commission is charged with 
enhancing, the project proponent cannot "create a conflict" by adding to the project an 
independent component to remedy the resource degradation. The benefits of a project must 
be inherent in the purpose of the project. If this provision were otherwise, project proponents 
could regularly "create conflicts" and then request that the Commission use Section 30007.5 
to approve otherwise unapprovable projects. The balancing provisions of the Coastal Act 
could not have been intended to foster such an artificial and easily manipulated process,·and 
were not designed to barter amenities in exchange for project approval. 
The ISFSI is designed to be a more stable and less intensive system of storage than wet 
storage. The project as proposed by PG&E consists ofmeasures necessary to ensure long-
term storage of spent nuclear fuel in a secure environment. Its benefits are a result of its 
basic design elements, which consist of enclosing spent nuclear fuel in multiple layers of 
concrete and metal within a reinforced concrete structure. The "essence" of the ISFSI is that 
fuel would be moved out of a facility that is at a lower elevation and is highly susceptible to 
the geologic events described above, and into a more stable facility less subject to those 
events and the risks associated with those events. 
7) There are no feasible alternatives that would achieve the objectives of the project 
without violating any Chapter 3 policies: 
Finally, a project does not present a conflict among Chapter 3 policies if at least one feasible 
alternative would meet the project's objectives without violating any Chapter 3 policy. Thus, 
an alternatives analysis is a condition precedent to invocation of the balancing approach. If 
there are alternatives available that are consistent with all of the relevant Chapter 3 policies, 
then the proposed project does not create a true conflict among those policies. 
As noted in Section 4.4 above, PG&E conducted an alternatives analysis to determine the 
best feasible location for the ISFSI. The analysis evaluated the "no project", offsite, and 
onsite alternatives. The "no project" alternative would have PG&E maintain the current wet 
storage system. While this system meets current federal requirements for nuclear safety, 
denial of the ISFSI would result in continued operation of the wet storage system and, as 
noted above, that system is not built or located in a manner that minimizes geologic risks. 
Therefore, denial of the ISFSI would result in a development inconsistent with that 
requirement of Section 30253(1). Regarding the offsite alternative, PG&E determined that 
there are no feasible offsite locations available. The Commission concurs that there are no 
offsite alternatives available at this time or in the foreseeable future. Regarding the five 
onsite alternatives, PG&E's analysis shows that each was less desirable than the proposed 
location, and the Commission concurs with that conclusion. Locating the ISFSI at any of 
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these alternative sites would have conflicted with the Section 30253(1) requirement to 
minimize geologic risks, since the other sites were at lower elevations or were less stable. 
Existence of a Conflict Between Chapter 3 Policies: Based on the above, the Commission 
finds that the proposed project presents a conflict between Sections 30253(1)-(2) and 30251, on 
the one hand, and Sections 30230, 30231, and 30240, on the other, that must be resolved through 
application of Section 30007.5, as described below. 
Conflict Resolution: After establishing a conflict among Coastal Act policies, Section 30007.5 
requires the Commission to resolve the conflict in a manner that is on balance most protective of 
coastal resources. As noted previously, the project would reduce but not minimize risks due to 
geologic hazards, it would eventually require shoreline protection during its anticipated operating 
life, and it would result in adverse visual impacts, thus making it inconsistent with Coastal Act 
Sections 30253(1 )-(2) and 30251. However, denying the project because of its inconsistency 
with these policies would result in significant adverse effects on biological resources due to the 
greater geologic risks associated with the existing storage area. 
In sum, the Commission finds that while the ISFSI would cause adverse visual impacts, would 
not minimize risks due to geologic hazards, and would eventually require a shoreline protection 
structure, it would also be sited at a location that is vastly superior to the location of the existing 
spent fuel storage pool, thus reducing the risks associated with those geologic hazards and, for 
that reason, increasing protection of coastal biological resources. The Special Conditions in 
Section 3 of this report are necessary to ensure the ISFSI's adverse impacts are minimized and its 
benefits are fully realized. Therefore, the Commission finds that approval of the proposed 
project notwithstanding its inconsistencies with several Coastal Act policies is "most protective 
of coastal resources" for purposes of the conflict resolution provisions of Coastal Act Section 
30007.5. 11 
11 Staff is recommending the Commission use Section 30007.5 to address the project's inconsistencies with several 
Chapter 3 policies. Alternatively, however, the proposal is approvable notwithstanding its inconsistencies with 
Chapter 3 policies under the "override" provisions of Section 30260, as described below. 
Coastal Act Section 30260 states: 
Coastal-dependent industrial facilities shall be encouraged to locate or expand within existing sites and 
shall be permitted reasonable long-term growth where consistent with this division. However, where new 
or expanded coastal-dependent industria/facilities cannot feasibly be accommodated consistent with other 
policies of this division, they may nonetheless be permitted in accordance with this section and Sections 
30261 and 30262 if(J) alternative locations are infeasible or more environmentally damaging; (2) to do 
otherwise would adversely affect the public welfare; and (3) adverse environmental effects are mitigated to 
the maximum extent feasible. 
Coastal Act Section 30260 provides that "coastal-dependent" industrial facilities that do not fully conform to other 
applicable Chapter 3 policies may nonetheless be permitted if they meet three tests. Coastal Act Section 3001 
defines a "coastal-dependent" development or use as that which "requires a site on or adjacent to the sea to be able 
to function at all." The Humboldt Bay Power Plant ("HBPP") was designed as a coastal-dependent industrial 
facility dependent on seawater to cool its generators and was sited next to the Bay to allow use of that water. The 
wet storage pool for the spent fuel was a necessary part of the power plant, as there were no offsite options for 
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storing the material. The proposed ISFSI is an equally integral component of that coastal-dependent industrial 
facility and therefore shares the coastal-dependent character of the larger HBPP of which it is a part. 
The Commission may apply Section 30260 to approve a "coastal-dependent industrial facility" if it meets three tests -
first, that alternative locations are infeasible or more environmentally damaging; next, that to do otherwise would 
adversely affect the public welfare; andfmally, that adverse environmental effects are mitigated to the maximum extent 
feasible. 
The first test of Section 30260 requires that there be no feasible, less environmentally damaging alternatives. As 
discussed above in Section 4.4, there are no other offsite locations available to store the spent fuel and there is 
considerable doubt as to when, if ever, alternative sites might become available. Additionally, none of the onsite 
alternative locations at the power plant would be less environmentally damaging, since they are lower in elevation or less 
stable geologically and therefore more prone to the geologic hazards described in Section 4.5.1. Therefore, the proposed 
ISFSI meets the first test of Section 30260. 
The second test of Section 30260 allows coastal-dependent industrial development to be permitted if to do otherwise 
would adversely affect the public welfare. There are several public benefits of the proposed project that would not occur 
if the project is not completed, including some based on the relative merit of the ISFSI over the existing wet storage 
pool. First, constructing and operating the ISFSI is one of many steps necessary for PG&E to decommission the existing 
nuclear power unit and storage area. By moving the spent fuel to the ISFSI, PG&E will be able to continue the 
decommissioning process, which will eventually reduce the overall environmental risks associated with the site - for 
example, decommissioning will eliminate the wastewater discharges now permitted from that part of the power plant and 
thus reduce adverse effects to the quality of the waters of Humboldt Bay. Second, the ISFSI is expected to be less costly 
to operate and maintain than the wet storage facility. Once built, it will have relatively low maintenance costs compared 
to the ongoing and intensive requirements of the wet storage pool. This difference is likely to be reflected in overall 
lower costs or lower rate increases for Californians within PG&E 's service area. Finally, and most importantly, although 
it is not perfect, the ISFSI is considered safer in many ways than the wet storage pool. By storing the spent fuel and 
other materials in the ISFSI, the project is likely to reduce if not eliminate the risks associated with any number of 
accidents, natural phenomena, or direct attack, including structural or operational failure of the pool, human error, 
seismic activity, tsunami, and terrorism The consequences of such events are almost unimaginable and significantly 
lessening the risks of such events occurring are clearly in the public interest. At the same time, the project would be 
detrimental to the public welfare in that it would create adverse visual impacts along this stretch of the Humboldt Bay 
shoreline, although those effects would be minimized through imposition of Special Condition #3. The Commission 
ftnds, however, that on balance, the benefits of the proposed project to the public welfare exceed the detriments, and the 
project therefore meets the second test of Section 30260. 
The third test requires that adverse environmental effects be mitigated to the maximum extent feasible. The ISFSI is 
designed to meet federal safety and security requirements related to nuclear waste storage. For those elements of the 
proposed project not pre-empted by federal law, and based on the characteristics of the ISFSI site, the Special Conditions 
imposed by the Commission provide the maximum feasible mitigation to address impacts to coastal resources. 
Additional measures that would minimize geologic risks would conflict with other Coastal Act policies - for example, 
hardening the bluff face would minimize risks but would not conform to Section 30253(2). The Special Conditions 
mitigate effects on other coastal resources- for example, the project's adverse effects on public access to the shoreline 
are addressed by ensuring that access will be maintained at the site through an appropriate legal instrument and submittal 
of an access plan with specific requirements to enhance existing access, and its effects on coastal waters and visual 
resources are minimized through necessary conditions. Therefore, the project as proposed and conditioned meets the 
third test of Section 30260. 
Conclusion 
Based on the discussion above and the fmdings in previous sections of this report, the Commission finds that the 
ISFSI, although inconsistent with Coastal Act Sections 30251 and 30253(1 )-(2), is a coastal-dependent industrial 
facility and may therefore be approved as it complies with the requirements of Coastal Act 30260. 
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CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT 
Section 13096 of the Commission's administrative regulations requires Commission approval of 
coastal development permit applications to be supported by a finding showing the application, as 
modified by any conditions of approval, to be consistent with any applicable requirements ofthe 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Section 21080.5(d)(2)(A) ofCEQA prohibits 
approval of a proposed development ifthere are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation 
measures available that would substantially lessen any significant impacts that the activity may 
have on the environment. As discussed above, the proposed project has been conditioned to be 
found consistent with the policies of the Coastal Act. Mitigation measures that will minimize or 
avoid all significant adverse environmental impacts have been required. As conditioned, there 
are no feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available, beyond those required, that 
would substantially lessen any significant adverse impact that the activity would have on the 
environment. Therefore, the Commission finds that the proposed project, as conditioned to 
mitigate the identified impacts, can be found consistent with the requirements of CEQ A. 
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APPENDIX A: SUBSTANTIVE FILE DOCUMENTS 
California Coastal Water Quality Monitoring Inventory. Monitoring Program Summary for 
PG&E's Humboldt Bay Power Plant NPDES Permit (at http://www.sfei.org/camp/ 
servlet/DisplayProgram?which=General&pid+NCCA0005622). Accessed July 28, 2005. 
Congressional Research Service. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Locations and Inventory (Order 
Code RS220001). December 21,2004. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Fact Sheet on Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, Feb 
11, 2004 (accessed via http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-
sheets/decommissioning.html) 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company. Safety Analysis Report, Environmental Report, and 
Emergency Plan from application to Nuclear Regulatory Commission for 10 CFR 72 
ISFSI License, 2003. 
__ . Humboldt Bay Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Emergency Plan. October 
2004. 
Redwood Community Action Agency, Natural Resources Services Division. Humboldt Bay 
Trails Feasibility Study. December 21, 2001. 
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Tom Luster, Coastal Program Analyst 
Mark Johnsson, Staff Geologist 
E-05-001 (Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Humboldt Bay Power Plant 
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) 
In regard to the above referenced Coastal Development Permit Application, I have reviewed the 
following documents submitted by the applicant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 
support of their license from that Commission: 
1} Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 2004, "Humboldt Bay Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation Environmental Report" dated October 2004. 
2} Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 2004, "Humboldt Bay Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation Safety Analysis Report" dated October 2004-
After reviewing these documents, I had several remaining concerns regarding the potential for 
coastal erosion at the site. In addition, because the Commission previously has determined that 
there is no reasonable expectation that a Federal spent nuclear fuel repository will ever be 
licensed to receive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants (see appeal A-3-SL0-04-035, 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation, December 2004), I asked the applicant to consider the effects of geologic hazards at 
the site on the proposed development over perpetuity, rather than over the 50-year design life 
cited by the applicant. These applicant addressed these questions with the following documents. 
3} Pacific Gas and Electric Company 2004, "Assessment of erosion at Buhne Hill, Humboldt Bay 
ISFSI", 32 P- report dated 10 September 2004 and signed by W _ o_ Page {CEG 1432}-
4) Pacific Gas and Electric Company 2005, "Implications of long-term global warming and 
tectonic displacements at Buhne Hill, Humboldt County, California", 86 p. report dated 18 July 
2005 and signed byW. D. Page {CEG 1432}. 
During the review of this application a major earthquake occurred in the vicinity of the proposed 
development. The applicant prepared the following report on the earthquake and its effects on 
the existing infrastructure at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant: 
5) Pacific Gas and Electric Company 2005, "Report on the M7_2 Offshore Northern California 
earthquake of June 14, 2005", 9 p. report dated and signed by M_ McLaren, S. Nishenko, N_ 
van der Elst and M. Stanton. 
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To help address the tsunami hazard at the site, the applicant submitted the following documents, 
which I also have reviewed: 
6) Abramson, H., 1998, Evidence for tsunamis and earthquakes during the last 3500 years from 
Lagoon Creek, a coastal freshwater marsh, Northern California [Masters thesis]: Arcata, 
California, Humboldt State University. 
7) Anonymous, 1981, E.A. White, The Union. 
8) Gardner, H.W., Lindberg (CEG 1895), D.N., Bickner, F.R., and Manhart, G.L., 1999, Final 
report of seismic study phase 3 at College of the Redwoods Eureka Campus: Eureka, 
California, LACO Associates, p. 24. 
9) Garrison-Laney, C.E., 1998, Diatom evidence for tsunami inundation from Lagoon Creek, a 
coastal freshwater pond, Del Norte County, California [Masters thesis]: Arcata, California, 
Humboldt State University. 
10) Kroeber, A.L., 1976, Yurek Myths: Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 488 p. 
11) Kroeber, A.L., and Gifford, E.W., 1949, World Renewal: A cult system of native northwest 
California: Anthropologic Records, v. 13, p. 1-155. 
12) LACO Associates, 1999, Site evaluation for the Child Development Center, fault rupture 
hazard, Phase C Investigation, College of the Redwoods, 7351 Tompkins Hill Road, Eureka 
California: Eureka, California, LACO Associates, p. 15. 
13) Leroy, T.H., 1999, Holocene sand dune stratigraphy and paleoseismicity of the north and 
south spits of Humboldt Bay, northern California [Masters thesis]: Arcata, California, 
Humboldt State University. 
14) Patton, J.R., 2004, Late Holocene coseismic subsidence and coincident tsunamis, southern 
Cascadia Subduction Zone, Hookton Slough, Wigi (Humboldt Bay), California [Masters 
thesis]: Arcata, California, Humboldt State University. 
15) Waterman, T.T., 1920, Yurek Geography: University of California Publications in American 
Archeology and Ethnology, v. 16, p. 177-314. 
16) Witter, R.C., Patton, J.R., Carver, G.A., Kelsey, H.M., Garrison-Laney, C., Koehler, R.D., and 
Hemphill-Haley, E., 2002, Upper-plate earthquakes on the western Little Salmon Fault and 
contemporaneous subsidence of southern Humboldt Bay over the past 3,600 years, 
northwestern California, U.S. Geological Survey National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 
Program, p. 19. 
I also have made use of a number of other references from the scientific literature on the 
Cascadia Subduction Zone, its seismic potential, and potential consequences of a major 
earthquake in the zone. These include: 
Atwater, B.F., Stuiver, M., and Yamaguchi, D.A., 1991, Radiocarbon test of earthquake 
magnitude at the Cascadia subduction zone: Nature, v. 353, p. 156-158. 
Clague, J.J., 1997, Evidence for large earthquakes at the Cascadia subduction zone: Review of 
Geophysics, v. 35, p. 439-460. 
Gulick, S.P .S., and Meltzer, AS., 2002, Effect of the northward-migrating Mendocino triple 
junction on the Eel River forearc basin, California: Structural evolution: Geological Society of 
America Bulletin, v. 114, p. 1505-1519. 
Gulick, S.P.S., Meltzer, A.S., and Clarke, S.H., Jr., 2002, Effect of the northward-migrating 
Mendocino triple junction on the Eel River forearc basin, California: Stratigraphic 
development: Geological Society of America Bulletin, v. 114, p. 178-191. 
Leonard, L.J., Hyndman, R.D., and Mazzetti, S., 2004, Coseismic subsidence in the 1700 great 
Cascadia earthquake: Coastal estimates versus elastic dislocation models: Geological 
Society of America Bulletin, v. 116, p. 655-670. 
Peterson, C.D., Barnett, E.T., Briggs, G.G., Carver, G.A., Clague, J.J., and Darienzo, M.E., 1997, 
Estimate of coastal subsidence from great earthquakes in the Cascadia subduction zone, 
Vancouver Island, B.C., Washington, Oregon, and northernmost California: Portland, Oregon, 
Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, p. 44. 
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Polenz, M., and Kelsey, H.M., 1999, Development of a Late Quaternary marine terraced 
landscape during on-going tectonic contraction, Crescent City coastal plain, California: 
Quaternary Research, v. 52, p. 217-228. 
Stewart, R.J., and Brandon, M.T., 2004, Detrital zircon fission-track ages for the "Hoh Formation": 
Implications for late Cenozoic evolution of the Cascadia subduction wedge: Geological 
Society of America Bulletin, v. 116, p. 60-75. 
Toppozada, T., Borchardt, G., Hayden, W., and Petersen, M., 1995, Planning scenario in 
Humboldt and Del Norte Counties, California, for a great earthquake on the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone: Sacramento, California, California Division of Mines and Geology Special 
Publication 115, 151 p. 
Witter, R.C., Kelsey, H.M., and Hemphill-Haley, E., 2003, Great Cascadia earthquakes and 
tsunamis of the past 6700 years, Coquille River estuary, southern coastal Oregon: Geological 
Society of America Bulletin, v. 115, p. 1289-1306. 
I have visited the site on three occasions over the past two years. On each of these visits, I 
examined the site itself and the current facilities. In addition, in March 2004 I participated, 
together with members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a field trip to examine rock 
units and the trace of the Little Salmon Fault in the Humboldt Bay area. The applicant's 
geotechnical team also prepared a two-day field for me in May 2005 to examine the sites of 
tsunami investigations in the Humboldt and Del Norte County area. I have had numerous 
meetings and conversations with Lloyd Cluff, director of the Geoscience Department at PG&E, 
and with members ofhis staff including Drs. William Page, Joseph Sun, Marcia McLaren, AND 
Norm Abrahamson. 
This memo will not be a point-by-point review of each of the documents cited above. Instead, 
after briefly describing the geologic and tectonic setting, I will summarize the geologic hazards 
at the site and indicate whether, in my opinion, the development can be found consistent with 
section 30253 of the Coastal Act, that states, in part: 
New development shall: 
(1) Minimize risks to life and property in areas of high geologic, flood, and fire hazard. 
(2) Assure stability and structural integrity, and neither create nor contribute significantly 
to erosion, geologic instability, or destruction of the site or surrounding area or in any 
way require the construction of protective devices that would substantially alter 
natural landforms along bluffs and cliffs. 
Geologic and Tectonic Setting 
The Humboldt Bay Power Plant lies on the eastern shore of Humboldt Bay, directly opposite the 
inlet between North and South Spits. The proposed site for the ISFSI is near the top ofBuhne 
Point, a hill that rises some 60 feet above the bay. The point is made up of the Hookton 
Formation, a marine terrace deposit approximately 80,000 years old that consists of poorly 
cemented sands and interbedded clays. 
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The site lies near the southern end of the Cascadia Subduction Zone, marking the junction of the 
North America plate and the Gorda Plate to the west. The Gorda Plate, and its northern 
extension, the Juan de Fuca Plate are being thrust beneath the North America Plate as the latter 
moves relatively westward. This movement is manifested in periodic very large earthquakes-
best estimated at about magnitude 9.0 with a recurrence interval of about 300-400 years. These 
earthquakes usually result in large tsunamis, and it is in fact deposits left from tsunamis that has 
been most useful in identifying past Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquakes. The last such 
earthquake occurred in the year 1700, and resulted in a tsunami that was recorded in historical 
Japanese documents of the era. 
The Little Salmon Fault is a thrust fault likely originating at the Gorda/North America plate 
interface at depth along the Cascadia Subduction Zone, and continuing to the surface of the 
North America Plate. The fault passes within two miles of the ISFSI site. This fault is thought to 
rupture concurrently with the Cascadia Subduction Zone. 
Two other active faults lie even closer to the ISFSI site, and also likely rupture concurrently with 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone. The Buhne Point Fault is a thrust fault dipping to the northeast 
that directly underlies the ISFSI site and reaches the surface some 300 feet southwest of the site. 
The Discharge Canal Fault is a high angle fault with a surface trace approximately 500 feet 
northeast of the ISFSI site. Together these two faults define a wedge, containing the ISFSI site, 
that is uplifted during fault movement. It is this uplift that is responsible for the topographic high 
that is Buhne Point. Despite extensive trenching across the ISFSI site, no signs of faulting within 
this wedge have been detected. 
Ground Shaking 
Historical Seismicity: 
The Humboldt Bay region is an area of high seismic activity. There have been over 120 recorded 
earthquakes greater than magnitude 5 within 100 miles of the ISFSI site, including 10 that have 
exceeded magnitude 7. Most of these earthquakes have occurred in the offshore region within 
and along the southern margin of the Gorda plate and on the Mendocino fault zone at its southern 
margin. Only one of these earthquakes occurred on the actual interface of the Gorda and North 
American plates (The M 7.2 1992 Petrolia earthquake); most of the others have occurred on the 
overriding North America plate. 
Six earthquakes have produced ground motions > 1 O%g at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant. Two 
moderate earthquakes, ML 5.3 in 1975 and ML 5.4 in 1994, produced relatively large ground 
motions of0.30g and 0.55g, respectively, the largest ground motions recorded at the site to date. 
In June 2005 there was a magnitude 7.2 earthquake in the middle of the Gorda Plate, 
approximately 60 miles offshore, approximately 50 miles from the proposed ISFSI site. This was 
a strike-slip event in a fault on the North America Plate, above the Gorda Plate descending in the 
Cascadia Subduction Zone. Despite the large magnitude of this quake, ground shaking at the 
ISFSI site was less than 0.1 g, and the tsunami that was generated was measured in inches and 
only detectable by careful examination of tide gages. 
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Ground Shaking in Future Earthquakes 
An earthquake of a given magnitude will produce different levels of ground shaking at different 
locations, depending on the distance of the location from the earthquake hypocenter, the nature 
of the soil or rock between the location and the earthquake, and soil and rock conditions at the 
site. The level of shaking is expressed by a term called "intensity", and is quantified by the 
Modified Mercalli Index, whereby intensities ranging from I (not felt) through XII (near total 
destruction) are assigned based on the level of damage sustained by human structures. Better 
quantification of the level of shaking also is possible; and the standard measure is peak ground 
acceleration (PGA), usually expressed as a fraction of the acceleration due to gravity (9.81 m/s2, 
or 1.0 g). Other measures, such as peak ground velocity, also may be used but these are more 
rarely tabulated. Peak ground acceleration is typically measured in horizontal and vertical 
directions. It can be expressed deterministically ("a given earthquake can be expected to produce 
a peak horizontal ground accelerations at the site of X g"), or probabilistically ("given the 
seismic environment at the site, there is a 10% chance that a peak ground acceleration of X g will 
be exceeded in 50 years"). The current trend is to express seismic risk in probabilistic terms. 
Peak ground accelerations depend not only on the intensity of the causative earthquake and the 
distance of the site from the hypocenter of the earthquake, but also on site characteristics. Most 
important is the depth and firmness of the soil and/or bedrock underlying the site. All of these 
parameters are evaluated in producing a seismic shaking hazard assessment of a site. In 
evaluating the response of structures to ground shaking, the frequency (cycles per second) of that 
shaking is important-higher frequency shaking is more damaging to smaller, more rigid 
structures, whereas lower frequency shaking is more damaging to larger, or more flexible 
structures. The proposed ISFSI facility fits into the latter category. Different ground acceleration 
values apply to seismic waves with different frequencies or periods. Thus, an earthquake with a 
peak ground acceleration of 0. 7 g may have a peak "spectral acceleration" (SA) of 1.1 g for 
waves of 0.3 second period, but only 0.5 g for waves with periods of 1 second. A typical 
earthquake produces seismic waves with many different periods, and a plot of spectral 
accelerations for an earthquake shows the ground accelerations for waves of all periods. 
The applicant has assessed the ground shaking that would occur at the site using a probabilistic 
seismic hazard analysis. The probabilistic analysis assumed a 2000 year return period; a lesser 
standard than the 10,000 year return event required for nuclear power plants. This is allowable 
because of a rule change made by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2003, lowering the 
design standard for ISFSI' s to a 2000 year return event. At the time this rule change was 
proposed, Commission staff provided comments to the Nuclear Regulatory commission 
objecting to the reduction in standards largely because the choice of a lower standard was 
arbitrary. A copy of this comment letter is attached to this memo. 
Part of developing a probabilistic seismic hazard assessment is identifying the maximum 
earthquake likely on any faults that could provide ground shaking at the site. The applicant has 
modeled this "maximum credible earthquake" as the simultaneous rupture of the entire length of 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone (some 600 miles long) coupled with the rupture of the Little 
Salmon Fault. Because of the size and locations of these faults a very large earthquake is 
assumed-up to a magnitude 9.1. This is roughly equivalent to the 26 December 2004 Sumatran 
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earthquake, and near the upper bound of any earthquake likely anywhere on Earth. The seismic 
potential of this area is as large as any spot on Earth. 
In order to assess the ground shaking at the site, the seismic energy is propagated from the 
presumed epicenter to the site, accounting for directivity effects and attenuation of energy that 
occurs through distance. The soil characteristics of the site are then used to judge any 
amplification effects. The final probabilistic seismic hazard assessment resulted in a seismic 
spectra peaking at nearly 2.9g at a period of 0.25 seconds. At the longer periods most important 
for influencing large structures such as the ISFSI, spectral accelerations were still over 1 g. These 
values of ground shaking were then used to derive design criteria for the construction of the 
ISFSI. 
These very high ground accelerations would seem to provide a conservative design basis for the 
ISFSI. Although I do object to the use of the 2000 year return period in the calculation of the 
probabilistic seismic hazard assessment, the analysis is so dominated by the M9 .1 Cascadia event 
that it is essentially such an event that is being modeled. It is therefore my opinion that the 
ground shaking possible at the site has been adequately characterized, and designing to this 
standard will result in a project that is consistent with Coastal Act section 30253 with respect to 
the ground motion hazard. 
Liquefaction 
Liquefaction of soils can occur during strong ground shaking if soils are water saturated and 
consist of loosely consolidated, well sorted sands. At the ISFSI site the water table lies at about 
six feet above sea level, or some 35 feet below ground level. In addition, there may be temporary 
perched ground water on clay layers within the Hookton. A relatively shallow ground water table 
coupled with the subterranean nature of the ISFSI indicates that liquefaction is a concern. 
Borings at the site show that the top 23 ft of soils consists of clayey sands and clays, followed 
by very dense sands and silty sands to depth of 50 to 53 ft. Very stiff to hard sandy silts/silts and 
very dense sand extend from 50 ft to below 400 ft. A standard means of testing for the 
liquefiability of soils is to perform a Standard Penetration Test, in which the number of blows it 
takes a hammer of standard weight to drive a standard sampling tube a distance of 12 inches. 
Empirically, it is found that for soils with blow counts of more than about 30, liquefication never 
occurs, and it is indeed rare in soils with blow counts between 20 and 30. The results of various 
Standard Penetrometer Tests in borings at the ISFSI site indicated that nearly all blowcounts are 
above 30. The few blowcounts that are below 30 are typically above 20 (dense) and are spatially 
isolated. From these data the applicant concludes, and I concur, that liquefaction will not occur in 
these soils. 
Slope Stability 
The applicant assessed slope stability under static conditions by calculating the factor of safety 
against sliding, using soil strength parameters measured at the site. They found that the factor of 
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safety at the ISFSI location was 2.69 with regard to the western slope (the coastal bluff), and 
4.94 with respect to the more gentle eastern slope towards the plant. These values are far in 
excess of the industry standard for new development of 1.5. As discussed under "coastal 
erosion," however, this level of stability cannot be assured in perpetuity if coastal erosion 
impinges on the site. 
The slope stability analyses indicated yield accelerations-the level of ground shaking needed to 
instigate landslides-to be 0.69g and 0.66g for the coastal bluff and the eastern slope, 
respectively. Since these levels of ground shaking are less than the design basis earthquake, it is 
likely that the slopes will fail during such an earthquake. The amount of displacements ofthe 
slide masses was calculated using a Newmark sliding block approach to be about one foot during 
the design basis earthquake. This is far in excess of the 50 mm usually considered acceptable for 
new construction, but the applicant has indicated that the design of the ISFSI can accommodate 
this amount of displacement. Accordingly, it is my opinion that overall global stability of the 
slopes adjacent to the site is sufficient that the ISFSI will not be subject to landslide hazards 
unless the slope configurations change as a result of coastal erosion. 
Surface Fault Rupture 
' 
Several active faults underlie the site. The Little Salmon Fault, The Bay Entrance Fault and the 
Buhne Point fault all dip to the northeast and underlie the site at various depths. The surface trace 
of the Buhne Point fault lies only about 300 feet south of the ISFSI site, and the surface trace of 
the Discharge Canal fault lies about 500 feet to the north. These two faults define a wedge, on 
which the ISFSI site is located. Through movement on these faults, the wedge is gradually 
uplifted and tilted. Although trenches across the site did encounter sand-filled fractures, none of 
them showed detectable offset and so are not considered active faults. The applicant believes that 
future deformation from displacement on the Little Salmon fault will be minor tilting with no 
differential displacements. I agree that this is likely, but I believe that it is certainly possible that 
one or both of these faults will shift position and that future fault movement could occur at the 
ISFSI site. It is quite common for faults to rupture along traces offset from previous ruptures, 
defining a "fault zone" rather than a single fault plane. This is, in fact, the case for these two 
faults as well, although the zone of fracturing does not appear to be more than a few tens of feet 
wide. Further, it is possible that a future movement along these faults could result in a different 
style of faulting. Given the proximity of the ISFSI to these active faults, I do not feel that it can 
be assured over perpetuity that the ISFSI will not be subjected to fault rupture. 
The applicant has shown evidence that large, massive structures (including ammunition bunkers, 
bank vaults, and buildings with massive foundations) have performed well in previous 
earthquakes in Taiwan, Turkey, and Nicaragua. Although these anecdotal observations are 
encouraging, there also are many examples of quite large, massive buildings being damaged by 
surface faulting. Accordingly, I cannot find that the site will be safe from fault rupture hazard. 
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Tsunami 
The applicant has sponsored extensive study of ancient tsunami deposits in Humboldt and Del 
Norte Counties; studies that have demonstrated repeated inundation by tsunamis during Cascadia 
Subduction Zone earthquakes. Most of these deposits were discovered in sheltered locations at 
relatively low elevation and give very little information regarding the maximum elevation to 
which tsunamis can run up. One exception is that tsunami deposits were not found behind North 
Spit, suggesting that the line of dunes, here about 40 feet high, is sufficient to protect that part of 
the bay from direct tsunami influence. In addition, Yurok oral legends tell ofthe tsunami of 
I700, and indicate that the maximum run-up was just to the lower portion of a village site at 
Orick, which lies at 40 feet elevation, In addition, the applicant has modeled the tsunami height 
expected from a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake, and also arrived at estimated runup 
heights of 30 to 40 feet on the open coast. The tsunami would be partly attenuated as it entered 
Humboldt Bay, and the modeled runup elevation at the ISFSI site is 2I to 36 feet. Even at Mean 
Higher High Water, the modeled runup is only 23 to 38 feet. Accordingly, the applicant 
concludes that the ISFSI site, at an elevation of 44 feet, would not be inundated. Further, the 
ISFSI site is below ground level and not subject to damage by missiles carried by the tsunami. 
Finally, the ISFSI would be unaffected by inundation. 
There are three reasons, however, that I cannot conclude that the site will be safe from a 
Cascadia Subduction Zone tsunami hazards in perpetuity. First, and perhaps most significant, is 
the comparison between the expected run ups at this site and the observed runups of as much as 
130 feet that occurred in Indonesia as a result of the 26 December 2004 Sumatran Earthquake. 
As indicated above, both the earthquake mechanism and the mechanism of tsunami generation 
for that earthquake is very similar to that expected for a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake 
and it is unclear whythe near-source tsunami runups would be so different for the two 
earthquakes. Second, it is customary when assessing tsunami inundation to model the tsunami at 
not only high tide, but also with a storm surge (usually a I 00-year storm) as well. If a Cascadia 
Subduction Zone tsunami were to hit during a period of high storm surge, the ISFSI site may 
well be damaged. Finally, the ISFSI site comprises a peninsula-like terrace that is underlain by 
poorly consolidated sands, silts, and clays. During a tsunami, this peninsula would be attacked 
from two directions. Erosion resulting from both incoming and retreating waves could, in my 
opinion, compromise the integrity of the ISFSI site. 
Because it is anticipated that the ISFSI will occupy the site in perpetuity, I asked the applicant to 
address what role sea level rise might have on the site. They prepared an analysis superimposing 
the tectonic uplift of Buhne Hill (estimated at about I.3 feet per I 00 years) on sea level ruse 
under several scenarios for time periods of I 00, I 000, I 0,000 and I 00,000 years. Their analysis 
of sea level rise, although necessarily poorly constrained, indicates that overtopping of the ISFSI 
by sea level rise in the next several thousand years is possible. Under such conditions, 
overtopping by a tsunami is likely. Sometime between I 000 and I 0,000 years, however, it is 
likely, based on our understanding of driving forces of glacial cycles, that the Earth will enter 
another glacial period. The resulting spread of polar ice will lock up large amounts of water, 
resulting in a lowering of sea level. Given continued uplift ofBuhne Hill, the ISFSI site actually 
will become safer from such effects as tsunamis and coastal erosion. 
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Coastal Erosion 
The subject site, like a long stretch of Humboldt Bay to the north, is armored by a rip-rap 
revetment. In the vicinity of the power plant, the revetment dates to 1952, when rip-rap was first 
placed to protect Unit 1. The rip rap was enlarged and modified in 1956-7, to protect Unit 2. 
After suffering storm damage in the 1980's, the revetment was repaired in 1989. This rip-rap has 
been very effective in protecting the site from coastal erosion. For some perspective in how 
erosion might effect the site if the revetment is not maintained at the site, the applicant examined 
historic shoreline retreat in reference (3) 
The applicant assessed historic shoreline retreat by reviewing 16 aerial photographs and maps 
(U.S. Coast Guard Charts and USGS maps) spanning the time interval1852 to 2000. Eight of 
these were deemed to be of sufficient accuracy and scale to provide estimates of the shoreline 
position. From 1858 until2000 total shoreline retreat has amounted to 1248 to 1485 feet. Prior to 
construction ofthejetties at the mouth ofHumboldt Bay, South Spit overlapped North Spit and, 
at least for the early 19th century, Buhne Hill was not exposed to attack by ocean waves. With the 
construction of the jetties, erosion was rapid. Between 1858 and 1870, the shoreline retreated at a 
rate of24-35 feet. Between 1870 and 1942 the rate of retreat was 4 to 9 feet, but between 1942 
and 1959 the bluff retreated at an average rate of 44 to 65 feet per year. The actual rate was 
somewhat higher than this, because the revetment was at least partially in place by 1952. 
Since the construction of the revetment, the bluff above the revetment has continued to retreat, 
but at a much lower rate (estimated at 1-4 inches per year). Much of this retreat has been by 
shallow landslides, and the bluff has been flattening through time. The bluff will continue to 
retreat, at least until a stable slope is attained., at which time one would expect the rate of bluff 
retreat to slow further or stop. 
What is clear from this analysis, however, is that in the absence of shoreline protection, coastal 
erosion will threaten the ISFSI on a decadal time span. The slope stability analyses assume the 
current configuration ofthe bluff. Even with modest bluff retreat, such as is predicted even in the 
presence ofthe current revetment, the static factor of safety and the expected seismic 
displacement will be lower and higher, respectively, than the calculations presented above. This 
site has experienced one of the highest coastal erosion rates documented in the state, is only 
protected from that erosion by a revetment that has required extensive maintenance in the past, 
and will only remain safe in the future with continued maintenance and, perhaps, expansion of 
the coastal armoring. 
Further, given future sea level rise discussed in reference (4), overtopping ofthe existing 
revetment and erosion of the upper bluffby direct wave attack is likely within the next several 
hundred years. Accordingly, it seems likely that stability of the ISFSI will require the 
construction of some type of upper bluff shoreline protection device, in clear violation of Section 
30253 of the Coastal Act. 
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Summary 
The applicant is to be commended in presenting a candid analysis of the geologic hazards at the 
site. They have demonstrated that the site is likely to be subjected to severe ground shaking, 
slope failures, tsunami, and coastal erosion. In addition, I believe that the site may be subject to 
surface fault rupture hazard as well. The applicant believes that all of these hazards can be 
mitigated for. On the other hand, the tsunami, surface fault rupture hazard, and coastal erosion 
hazard at this site, coupled with an essentially infinite design life, lead me to believe that it is not 
possible to assure that the proposed development will not be significantly affected by these 
geologic hazards, as required by section 30253 of the Coastal Act. 
I hope that this review is helpful. Please contact me with any questions or concerns. 
Sincerely, 
~L 
Mark Johnsson, Ph.D., CEG, CHG 
Staff Geologist 
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To: Commissioners and interested parties 
From: Mark Johnsson, Staff Geologist 
Re: Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule change regarding Geological and 
Seismological Characteristics for Siting and Design of Dry Cask Independent 
Spent Fuel Storage Installations and Monitored Retrievable Storage 
Installations 
On 22 July 2002 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published a proposed 
change to 10 CFR Part 72, which would have three functions: 
1. Require a new specific license applicant for a dry cask storage facility located 
in either the western U.S. or in areas of known seismic activity in the eastern U.S., 
and not co-located with a nuclear power plant, to address uncertainties in seismic 
hazard analysis by using appropriate analyses, such as a probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis (PSHA) or suitable sensitivity analyses, for determining the 
design earthquake ground motion (DE). All other new specific license applicants 
for dry cask storage facilities would have the option of complying with the 
proposed requirement to use a PSHA or suitable sensitivity analyses to address 
uncertainties in seismic hazard analysis, or other options compatible with the 
existing regulation. (§ 72.1 03) 
2. Allow new ISFSI or MRS applicants to use a DE appropriate for and 
commensurate with the risk associated with an ISFSI or MRS (§ 72.1 03); and 
3. Require general licensees to evaluate that the designs of cask storage pads and 
areas adequately account for dynamic loads, in addition to statfc loads.(§ 72.212) 
Commission staff objected to several aspects of the proposed rule change, especially the 
fact that the rule change would effectively lower the seismic design standard for dry 
cask storage facilities without justification. On 16 October 2002 the Executive Director 
sent a comment letter (attached) to the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. The Commission staff was joined in this effort by the California Energy 
Commission and the California Seismic Safety Commission, who sent similar comment 
letters under the same cover. 
On 16 September 2003 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the final rule, which 
is essentially unchanged from the proposed rule. Response to Commission comments 
were published in the Federal Register at that time, and staff considers them 
unresponsive. The final rule becomes effective on 16 October 2003. 
The Commission's staff geologist will present the NRC's responses to the Commission 
during in the Energy and Ocean Resources Report on Thursday morning, 9 October 
2003 (item Th3). 
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GRAY DAVIS, GOVERNOR 
16 October 2002 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Washington, DC 20555-0001 
Dear Commissioners, 
This letter is to express the concerns of the California Coastal Commission staff with respect to 
the proposed rule change regarding geologic and seismologic characteristics for siting and design 
of dry cask independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSI) and monitored retrievable storage 
(MRS) installations, described in the Federal Register (v. 67, n. 140, pg 47745-47755). As 
detailed in the Federal Register, the proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 72 would have three 
functions: 
1. Require a new specific license applicant for a dry cask storage facility located 
in either the western U.S. or in areas of known seismic activity in the eastern U.S., 
and not co-located with a nuclear power plant, to address uncertainties in seismic 
hazard analysis by using appropriate analyses, such as a probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis (PSHA) or suitable sensitivity analyses, for determining the 
design earthquake ground motion (DE). All other new specific license applicants 
for dry cask storage facilities would have the option of complying with the 
proposed requirement to use a PSHA or suitable sensitivity analyses to address 
uncertainties in seismic hazard analysis, or other options compatible with the 
existing regulation.(§ 72.103) 
2. Allow new ISFSI or MRS applicants to use a DE appropriate for and 
commensurate with the risk associated with an ISFSI or MRS (§ 72.1 03); and 
3. Require general licensees to evaluate that the designs of cask storage pads and 
areas adequately account for dynamic loads, in addition to static loads.(§ 72.212) 
These comments principally regard function (2), which would be achieved through Regulatory 
Guide DG-3021, "Site evaluations and determination of design earthquake ground motion for 
seismic design of independent spent fuel storage installations and monitored retrievable storage 
installations." As outlined in the Environmental Assessment, the proposed rule change, in 
conjunction with Regulatory Guide DG-3021, would have the effect oflowering the design 
standard for ISFSI and MRS installations from a DE with a mean annual probability of 
exceedance of 1.0 X 104 (i.e., a DE with a return interval of 10,000 years) to a DE with a mean 
annual probability of exceedance of 5.0 x 104 (i.e., a DE with a return interval of2,000 years). 
Three ISFSI' s are currently proposed for the coast of California. Coastal Commission staff are 
very concerned that they be built to appropriate seismic design standards. 
The California Coastal Commission was established in 1976 by the California Coastal Act 
(California Public Resource Code§ 30000 et seq.) to provide long-term protection of 
California's 1,1 00-mile coastline for the benefit of current and future generations. A prime 
responsibility ofthe Commission is the review of proposed development projects located within 
areas of the Commission's jurisdiction, and the evaluation oflocal government decisions that 
have been appealed to the Commission. One component of this review is to assure that proposed 
development will minimize risks to life and property in areas of high geologic hazard, and assure 
stability and structural integrity of the proposed development (California Public Resource Code§ 
30253). An important tool in achieving this assurance is the application of appropriate seismic 
design standards. In an area as populated, economically important, and environmentally sensitive 
as the coast of California, the capacity for any development to release hazardous material during 
a major earthquake must be reduced to the lowest possible level. Ideally, this can be achieved by 
siting such development away from environmentally sensitive resources or populated areas. 
Where this is complicated by logistic or, as in the case of an ISFSI, regulatory constraints, the 
only recourse to assure the safety of the environment is adherence to appropriate design 
standards. In the case of high-level nuclear waste, located adjacent to the sea in populated 
regions, the highest possible seismic design standards must be applied. 
The Coastal Commission staff has no objection to those portions ofthe proposed rule change that 
would require a PSHA for an ISFSI not co-located with a nuclear power plant. Nor does staff . 
object to the provisions that allow an ISFSI co-located with a nuclear power plant to apply either 
a PSHA or adhere to the currently existing regulation. In addition, we raise no objection to the 
proposed requirement that the designs of cask storage pads and areas adequately account for 
dynamic loads. 
Commission staff does object, however, to the proposed reduction in seismic design standards as 
manifested by the reduction from a DE with a mean annual probability of exceedance of 1.0 x 
104 to one with a mean annual probability of exceedance of 5.0 x 104 . The Environmental 
Assessment lists a number of factors that may lead to a lower radiological risk at an ISFSI or 
MRS as compared to a nuclear power plant. Without debating the merits of these arguments, we 
note that no basis is provided for lowering the DE to any particular value. In the absence of 
quantitative evidence justifying a particular value, we feel that the conservative, precautionary 
approach of requiring ISFSI and MRS installations to meet the same design standard as a nuclear 
power plant is most appropriate. We note that meeting those standards would be far easier at an 
ISFSI or MRS than at a nuclear power plant, due to the relative simplicity of construction and 
robust character of these structures as compared to a nuclear power plant. Accordingly, we 
request that Regulatory Guide DG-3021 specify a DE with a mean annual probability of 
exceedance of 1.0 x 104 , consistent with the requirement for nuclear power plants. 
If the Nuclear Regulatory Commission desires to change the required DE for ISFSI and MRS 
installations, then the NRC must provide a sound quantitative basis for choosing any particular 
DE. Part of the difficulty in justifying a particular DE is that there are no clearly articulated 
performance standards behind the proposed rule change. What, exactly, are the seismic design 
standards intended to achieve? Are they intended to prevent the release of radiation beyond a 
certain level? What level? Are they intended to assure the structural integrity ofthe facility 
following a major earthquake? To what extent? Are they intended to allow continued operation 
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of the facility? In short, what level of damage is to be tolerated?-Only after the identification of 
definite performance goals will it be possible to justify any particular seismic design standard to 
meet those goals. Accordingly, we request that the NRC identify such performance goals before 
further consideration of any change in seismic design standards for ISFSI and MRS installations. 
We are particularly concerned that a lowering of the DE might be construed as allowing for a 
concomitant lowering of the design-basis tsunami for locally sourced tsunamis. It is especially 
important that an appropriate standard for a locally sourced tsunamis be applied because perhaps 
the most likely scenario for release of radiation to the environment is damage to an ISFSI or 
MRS during a major earthquake, immediately followed by inundation of the damaged facility by 
a tsunami. 
Further, Coastal Commission staff feels that it is inappropriate to write the proposed new section, 
10 CFR § 72.103, in such a way as to remove from the regulation the detailed guidance found in 
Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100. As proposed, the new section contains only general reference 
to non-seismic factors affecting geologic stability of the site, including slope stability, tsunamis, 
and secondary seismic effects such as ground lurching, liquefaction, and dynamic compaction. 
Removing detailed guidance on how to analyze for such issues places the entire responsibility of 
review at the discretion of the NRC. Not only does this inappropriately remove the statutory 
requirements for specific types of evaluation, it removes the certainty for both the license 
applicant and the interested public as to what is expected during such a review. Accordingly, we 
request that the NRC retain the guidance found in Appendix A ofPart 100 as statutory 
requirements for licensing ISFSI and MRS installations. 
We question the assertion that the NRC now has considerable experience in the licensing of dry 
cask storage systems and in analyses demonstrating the robust behavior of dry cask storage 
systems, as stated in the Environmental Assessment. The NRC has licensed only four ISFSI's in 
the western United States, the most seismically active part of the country, and none of these are 
as close to major plate-boundary faults as the three ISFSI's planned for coastal California. 
Further, we submit that experience in licensing does not equate with "real world" experience that 
will only be achieved when an ISFSI experiences strong ground motions as a result of a nearby 
major earthquake. As such, the provisions in neither the specific nor the general licenses have 
been tested. 
Finally, we note that under the California Coastal Act, either the State of California or a local 
government with a certified Local Coastal Plan will be required to issue a coastal development 
permit authorizing the construction of any ISFSI to be located within the Coastal Zone of 
California. Permits granted by local governments may be appealable to the Coastal Commission. 
In order to issue a coastal development permit, a finding must be made that the proposed ISFSI 
will minimize risks to life and property in areas of high geologic hazard, and assure stability and 
structural integrity of the proposed development. When the Coastal Commission issued a coastal 
development permit for the ISFSI at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in San 
Diego County, making such a finding was difficult given uncertainty regarding the seismic 
environment at the site. During permit review, the applicant relied on the seismic evaluation 
undertaken for licensing of the nuclear power plant. However, new information that became 
available in the years following the licensing of SONGS cast some doubt on the suitability ofthe 
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Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ground motion. It was only because the applicant proposed a 
seismic design standard far in excess of the SSE that the Coastal Commission was able to make 
the required finding (attached). Such a finding may not be possible at future sites if, as a result of 
the proposed rule change, applicants design future ISFSI' s to lower seismic design standards 
than those required for nuclear power plants. The proposed rule change makes the approval of 
coastal development permits for future ISFSI' s difficult, at best. 
Please contact me or Dr. Mark Johnsson of my staff at 415-904-5200 if you have any additional 
questions or comments. The Coastal Commission staff looks forward to continuing to work with 
the NRC on these issues and respectfully requests a response that addresses our concerns. 
Attachment: SONGS Coastal Development Permit staff report' 
cc: Coastal Commissioners 
Mark Johnsson, Staff Geologist, California Coastal Commission 
James Boyd, Commissioner, California Energy Commission 
Richard McCarthy, Executive Director, Seismic Safety Commission 
James Davis, State Geologist 
Mary Nichols, Secretary of Resources 
Gray Davis, Governor 
page4 o£4 
Sincerely, 
Peter Douglas 
Executive Director 
